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Hurrah for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar upon horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places but the lash goes on.
 [*794]   
INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy of state constitutionalism seems all but taken for granted. After three decades of
experimentation and debate, state courts have come routinely to give independent significance to
their state constitutions, without reference to federal court decisions construing correlative
provisions of the Federal Constitution. n2 The "new federalism" is no longer new. n3
There remains the question whether the state constitutional "revolution" has made any
difference. No doubt it has in terms of substantive law. The very impetus for resort to state
constitutional interpretation was the perception that the federal courts - in particular, the United
States Supreme Court - during the Burger era were engaged in a systematic effort to dismantle the
civil rights jurisprudence of the Warren Court. State courts stepped into the breach with decisions
substantially more protective of civil rights. n4
Whether that is all that can be said of state constitutionalism is the focus of this Article. Rather
than focus on the substantive results of constitutional decisions, I target the methods of the
decisions themselves. Federal court decisions - in particular, United States Supreme Court decisions
- long have been criticized for their failure to reflect any coherent theory of constitutional meaning.
n5 The question I address is whether the same criticism may be leveled at state constitutional
decisions.
I begin by briefly addressing the importance of constitutional interpretive theory, summarizing
the range of interpretive possibilities, reviewing current federal constitutional decision-making
practices, and identifying examples of various approaches to interpretation that the courts apply in
determining the meaning  [*795]  of the Federal Constitution. n6 After laying that groundwork, I
devote the majority of my effort to an examination of the practice of state constitutional decision
making. I have chosen to focus on the case law of a single jurisdiction to permit more in-depth
analysis without the Article becoming unwieldy. I have selected the case law of Oregon for this
study because, for several decades, Oregon has been at the forefront of the state constitutional
revolution and, as a result, has perhaps the most well-developed body of state constitutional case
law in the nation. n7
In short, I have encountered some interesting patterns in my examination of the Oregon state
constitutional decisions. To begin with, the Oregon courts are very methodologically conscious.
They have adopted, in fact, a "template" that, on its face, applies to all questions of state
constitutional interpretation. According to the template, Oregon courts determine the meaning of a
given provision of the state constitution by examining the text of the provision itself, its historical
context, and the case law construing it. n8 The template is originalist in orientation. Yet the
decisions provide no explanation as to why an originalist interpretive approach was adopted.
Indeed, the Oregon courts - like courts generally - appear unaware of the considerable body of
criticism of that interpretive approach. Moreover, and more interesting for my purposes, the Oregon
courts do not consistently follow their own originalist template.
Instead, careful examination of the state constitutional decisions over the past thirty years
reveals at least a half dozen different interpretive approaches taken by the Oregon courts, depending
on the particular constitutional provision at issue. At times, the courts' decisions are indeed
originalist in orientation. But at other times, the history of a provision and the intentions or probable
understandings of its framers prove entirely irrelevant. Instead, the court unapologetically will
appeal to the text alone, to judicially created doctrine, to constitutional structure, even - of all things
- to federal law.
I conclude that, although selected Oregon decisions employ some interesting rhetoric about
constitutional interpretation, in  [*796]  practice, the decisions resort to essentially the same
interpretive practices that may be found in countless federal constitutional decisions over the past
half century. To return to the question that I posed at the outset, state constitutionalism - at least the
state constitutionalism reflected in the Oregon cases that I have examined - appears to have made
little difference other than to provide the courts an opportunity to arrive at different results than the
application of federal law otherwise would require.
I
CONTEXT
Before embarking on my detailed examination of Oregon constitutional interpretation, it seems
appropriate to provide some theoretical and historical context. I begin by addressing the question
why it is important even to engage in the examination. I then briefly describe the variety of
approaches to constitutional interpretation reflected in federal court decisions about the meaning of
the United States Constitution. Finally, I describe - again, briefly - the development of state
constitutionalism generally.
A. The Significance of Constitutional Interpretation
State and federal constitutions provide the basic blueprints for our systems of government,
allocating powers, obligations, and rights among federal and state governments and their citizens.
The blueprints, however, provide little detail. To the contrary, they are exasperatingly blurry in
many key respects. n9 The Federal Constitution, for example, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishment." n10 Yet it provides no definition of the phrase. It fails even to include any
examples of what constitutes a punishment that is "cruel and unusual." Similarly, the Oregon
Constitution provides that no citizen may be denied "equal privileges or immunities." n11 But it
fails to provide a list of what constitutes a "privilege" or an "immunity."
It thus falls on someone to explain what the vague provisions  [*797]  of state and federal
constitutions mean. In fact, it falls on a host of individuals and institutions to interpret the state and
federal constitutions. Members of state legislatures and of the United States Congress interpret the
Federal Constitution in making decisions about the appropriate exercise of their legislative powers.
Governors and presidents interpret their constitutions in determining the conduct of administrative
agencies, in issuing executive orders, or in determining whether to veto particular bills. Police
officers interpret state and federal constitutions in evaluating whether a suspect has waived his or
her constitutional rights before agreeing to answer investigative questions. n12
The question, of course, is whose interpretation of a constitution is authoritative. When there is
disagreement about the meaning of a constitutional provision, who determines which interpretation
is the correct one? Unfortunately, neither state nor federal constitutions explicitly identify who is
assigned the task of authoritatively determining their meaning. Nevertheless, since Marbury v.
Madison, n13 the courts have asserted that they occupy the role of final arbiters of constitutional
meaning. They have justified that assertion on the ground that a constitution is law, and it is one of
the functions of the courts to interpret and determine the nature, scope, and effect of law. n14
Constitutions are, in particular, written law, and this carries  [*798]  with it significant
implications. Most important, for my purposes at least, is the implication that there must be limits to
what state and federal constitutions can be said to establish. n15 Constitutions cannot be interpreted
willy-nilly to mean whatever an interpreter wishes. The United States Constitution, for example,
provides that one qualification for the office of president is that the candidate be at least thirty-five
years of age. n16 The courts could not determine that the Constitution does not mean what it says -
that, say, a minimum age of eighteen will suffice. Such a "construction" of the Constitution would
be regarded as illegitimate. State and federal constitutions would lose any force of authority if their
language could be so easily ignored in favor of the ideas and ideals of the courts. Likewise, the
courts themselves would lose any legitimacy in asserting their role as the final arbiters of the
"meaning" of constitutions. For if the language of the documents imposes no limits on those who
interpret them, the courts are in no better position than anyone else to assert the authority to have
the final say as to what they mean.
Thus, preserving the authoritativeness of the constitutions and the legitimacy of the courts
requires that constitutional meaning in some sense be justifiable in terms other than the personal
preferences of the judges who determine that meaning. n17 Interpretive theory provides a
justification. It establishes rules by which constitutional meaning is ascertained, rules that exist
independent of those who must apply them.
I hasten to assert an important qualification at this point. I am not suggesting that interpretive
rules determine how decisions themselves are made. The psychology of judicial decision making is
no doubt much more complex than the application of neutral principles of constitutional
interpretation. But those  [*799]  principles do provide explanations for the decisions that are
reached by those or other means. I take it as given, in other words, that what appears in judicial
opinions is not necessarily an explanation of how a court arrived at a decision. It is, instead, a
justification for the decision. n18 It is the use of interpretive theory to justify particular decisions
that is the focus of my attention.
Precisely what constitutes a coherent "interpretive theory" is an interesting question. A wide
variety of different approaches has been suggested, and there is far from any consensus on the
[*800]  matter. n19 Some constitutional scholars, for example, have suggested that the reasonable
interpretation of the text of a constitution should be the principal focus. n20 Others have suggested
that "originalism" is the only appropriate interpretive approach. n21  [*801]  Such scholars contend
that a written constitution by its very nature suggests that those who enacted it by democratic
processes intended it to have some particular effects and any departure from that intended effect is
antidemocratic. n22 Still others maintain that the ascertainment of original intent is fraught with
difficulties, and that it is really impossible to conjure up the collective intentions of people who
lived 150 or 200 years ago. n23 Other scholars contend that, even accepting the plausibility of
identifying original intent, there is no good reason for constraining present generations by the dead
hand of framers who lived in radically different times. n24 Finally some contend that the textualist
[*802]  and originalist approaches both are inadequate, that both are excessively concerned with
connecting constitutional interpretation with an authoritative source. These scholars propose what is
known as a "common-law" approach to the development of constitutional law, in which the
constitutional text is but one of many factors that come into play in justifying a judicial decision.
n25 This is but a sample of the rich literature that exists addressing the theoretical possibilities.
B. Interpretation and the Federal Constitution
Although the importance of interpretive theory to the legitimacy of judicial review seems plain
enough, it has received scant attention in judicial opinions concerning the construction of the
Federal Constitution. To the contrary, federal courts - in particular, the United States Supreme Court
- employ a wide variety of interpretive approaches in ascertaining the meaning of federal
constitutional provisions. n26
At times, the Court has employed a fairly strict textual approach to the Constitution, treating the
task of interpretation more or less as an exercise in sentence diagraming, without regard to the
intentions of those who drafted the text in the first place. n27 Perhaps the most extreme example is
the Court's opinion  [*803]  in the infamous Slaughterhouse Cases. n28 In that opinion, the Court
effectively eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
basis of its syntax, the clause referring only to the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States," not the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the states themselves. n29
At other times, the Court has construed the Constitution without regard to its language, paying
more attention to "structural" concerns that are more or less implicit in the document as a whole.
For more than a century, for example, the Court consistently has maintained that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits a citizen from suing his or her own state in federal court, even though the
amendment says nothing of the sort. n30
 [*804]  In a related vein, the Court at times has divined the existence of constitutional rights by
reference not to the text of any particular constitutional provision, but rather to incorporeal
"emanations" or "penumbras" that implicitly flow from the text. The Court's controversial opinion
in Griswold v. Connecticut n31 illustrates the practice. In that case, the Court ascertained that the
Federal Constitution guaranteed a "zone of privacy" by virtue of certain "penumbras, formed by
emanations from" the specific guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. n32
[*805]  Griswold, in turn, laid the groundwork for the Court's recognition in Roe v. Wade n33 of a
constitutional right to an abortion, a right that certainly is difficult to defend on strictly textual or
originalist grounds. n34
In a substantial number of cases, the Court has employed a decidedly originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation. n35  [*806]  For example, in determining that obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment, the Court relied on the historical record of regulation of
obscenity at English common law and in prerevolutionary America. n36 The Court held that, in
light of the extensive regulation of obscenity that existed at the time of the enactment of the First
Amendment, it is unlikely that the Framers understood obscenity to be "speech" within the meaning
of the Constitution. n37 Similarly, in determining the scope of congressional power to exclude a
member elected to serve n38 and in ascertaining the constitutionality of congressional term-limit
legislation, n39 the  [*807]  Court devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to reconstructing
the intentions of the Framers as reflected in a wide variety of historical sources.
And yet, in a substantial number of other cases, the Court flatly declines to adopt an originalist
approach to interpreting the Constitution. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, for example, obviously was not understood at the time of adoption to prohibit capital
punishment. The constitutional text itself prohibits the deprivation of life only without due process
of law. n40 Nevertheless, the Court has adopted an "evolving community standards" approach to the
interpretation of the clause, which permits the court, at least in some instances, to conclude that the
death penalty is unconstitutional. n41
In a related practice, the Court frequently will pay little, if any, heed to constitutional text or
history and focus instead on the development of a coherent doctrine concerning the particular rights
involved. An excellent example may be found in the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. The
genealogy of the court's twentieth century takings cases traces not to the Constitution, but to a few
lines of dictum in Justice Holmes's famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. n42 "The
general rule at least," Holmes wrote, "is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." n43 Since then, the Court has wrestled
continuously - and largely unsuccessfully - with determining not what the framers understood the
takings clause to mean, but how to develop a coherent regulatory takings doctrine based on
Holmes's reference  [*808]  to regulation going "too far" in Pennsylvania Coal. n44
Clearly, from the viewpoint of interpretive theory, the case law of the United States Supreme
Court is in a state of considerable disarray. Indeed, the lack of adherence to any consistent
interpretive approach has spawned a fairly steady stream of criticism of the legitimacy of the Court's
decisions throughout this century, but especially following its historic decisions in Brown v. Board
of Education n45 and Roe v. Wade n46
C. The State Constitutional Revolution
However incoherent, federal constitutional analysis dominated for the better part of a century
even state court decisions concerning the meaning of state constitutional counterparts to federal
constitutional provisions. Precisely why state courts chose to employ federal constitutional analysis
to state constitutional questions is not entirely clear. n47 It appears that the courts assumed  [*809]
that, notwithstanding frequent textual variations between state and federal constitutional provisions,
the framers of the state constitutions must have intended that their constitutions have the same effect
as their federal parallels. As the Oregon Supreme Court characteristically explained with respect to
federal and state constitutional self-incrimination clauses, "nothing turns upon the variations of
wording in the constitutional clauses." n48 Whatever the reason, the practice became well-nigh
universal.
At least until the 1970s. At that point, state courts around the country began to question the
assumption that parallel state and federal constitutional provisions must have identical meaning.
Conventional wisdom attributes the genesis of this "revolution" to a 1977 law review article by
Justice William Brennan. Brennan's article called for state courts to independently construe their
own state constitutions to provide civil rights protections in the wake of United States Supreme
Court decisions professing increasing disinclination to find such protections in the federal
constitution. n49 His article is regularly characterized as a "clarion call to state judges to wield their
own bills of rights." n50
Actually, the call occurred earlier than that. In 1970, Professor Hans Linde published his
ground-breaking article, Without "Due  [*810]  Process," n51 in which he issued a plea for
recognition of the independent significance of state constitutions. Indeed, there are scattered
instances of state courts doing precisely that even earlier. n52 The Brennan article, however, did
focus national attention on the subject. And whoever was first to issue the clarion call, the fact
remains that it was not until the Burger Court emerged as openly hostile to Warren Court activism
that the state courts were given a reason to heed it. n53
Early state constitutional decisions, in fact, were openly reactive to federal constitutional
jurisprudence. And this fact led to  [*811]  substantial early criticism of the "new federalism" as
nothing more than a result-oriented opportunity for more liberal state courts to circumvent what
they perceived as unacceptably conservative federal constitutional decisions. n54 A more "mature"
state constitutionalism soon emerged, however, which asserted the appropriateness of independent
interpretation of state constitutions on theoretical grounds independent of particular case outcomes.
n55
 [*812]  The question soon arose: Exactly when is it appropriate to examine state constitutional
provisions independent of their federal constitutional counterparts? Two schools of thought
emerged. n56 One counsels attention to state constitutions before looking to the Federal
Constitution. n57 Often denominated the "first things first" approach, n58 it is premised on notions
of logic, n59 judicial economy n60 and a commitment to the enforcement of state law. n61  [*813]
The other approach encourages resort to state constitutional provisions only when the Federal
Constitution proves in some way unsatisfactory. n62 The approach reflects a view that state
constitutions are merely supplemental to the Federal Constitution. n63
Although state courts and academic commentators have devoted much attention to this question
of when to engage in independent state constitutional interpretation, surprisingly little attention has
been devoted to how the independent interpretation should be accomplished. n64 A few courts have
taken up the  [*814]  subject in general terms. The Vermont Supreme Court, for example, has
cataloged the variety of arguments that it might consider relevant in ascertaining the meaning of its
state constitution, among them the resort to historical materials, the constitutional text, and reliance
on economic and sociological data. n65 The court's catalog was deliberately open-ended. "The
imaginative lawyer," the court said, "is still the fountainhead of our finest jurisprudence." n66
A few other states have gone further and have attempted to draw some definitive conclusions
about the proper methodology for state constitutional interpretation. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, for instance, divided all provisions of its constitution into two categories, certain "great
ordinances" and the remaining,  [*815]  lesser, more detailed provisions that announce "no principle
of government." n67 The former provisions are interpreted so that the "underlying spirit, intent and
purpose" are applied to "the problems of the day." n68 The latter are read more literally. n69 The
North Carolina Supreme Court employs a similar dichotomy, giving broad, purposive reading to
"great ordinances" and narrow construction to detailed administrative provisions. n70 These cases
reflect a sensitivity to the distinctiveness of state constitutions, which - unlike their federal
counterpart - frequently include detailed, statute-like provisions on a wide variety of subjects
ranging from the issuance of pollution control bonds to the details of public school finance. n71
The Oregon Supreme Court, too, has explicitly adopted a methodology for the interpretation of
its constitution. It is to the development and application of that methodology that I now turn.
II
OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Before the Revolution: A Prehistory of Oregon Constitutional Interpretation
Oregon's constitution was approved by the people in 1857 and went into effect in 1859. n72
Records of the constitutional convention  [*816]  that led to the adoption of the constitution are
sketchy. n73 From the available evidence, it appears that no one paid much attention to the question
of judicial review generally, much less to the particulars of state constitutional interpretation. n74
The courts, however, had no trouble in figuring out what to do. Following the interpretive
conventions of the middle-to late-nineteenth century, n75 the court tended to spend little time
justifying its reading of state constitutional provisions. When the plain meaning of the constitutional
text did not suffice, the courts resorted  [*817]  to a more or less originalist approach, n76
frequently supplemented by reference to contemporaneous construction, n77 well-known maxims of
statutory or constitutional construction, n78 and to the constructions of similar provisions by courts
in other jurisdictions. n79
Interpreting state constitutional provisions that paralleled the Federal Constitution proved
different. In those cases, the clear preference of the Oregon courts was simply to treat the state and
federal provisions as if they were one and the same. This was true even when there were obvious
textual differences between state and federal provisions.
For example, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no
State shall make or enforce any  [*818]  law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." n80 Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution uses some of the
same words but is very different: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens
privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." n81
As early as 1919, in State v. Savage, n82 the Oregon Supreme Court recognized the difference in
the wording, as well as its potential significance. The provisions of the state constitution, the court
observed, "are the antithesis of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they prevent the enlargement of
the rights of others while the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the curtailment of rights." n83
Nevertheless, the court repeatedly and explicitly held that the scope of the state and federal clauses
is identical, that is, the meaning of the state provision is defined by United States Supreme Court
case law applying the Fourteenth Amendment. As the court declared in its 1958 decision in
Plummer v. Donald Drake Co.:
The controlling principles which guide the courts in determining questions of alleged
unconstitutional discrimination ... are the same whether it is the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which
is invoked or the privileges and immunities provision in article I, section 20, of the
Oregon Constitution. Fundamentally, classification is a matter committed to the
discretion of the legislature, and the courts will not interfere with the legislative
judgment unless it is palpably arbitrary. n84
The court also held that the state and federal takings clauses "are identical in language and
meaning," in spite of the fact that, strictly speaking, they are not. n85 Similarly it held that, as to the
meaning of the state and federal self-incrimination clauses, "nothing turns upon variations of
wording in the constitutional clauses." n86
The court flirted with the idea that those state constitutional  [*819]  provisions have
independent significance. Indeed, there are a few scattered instances in which the court based a
decision on a state constitutional provision independent of its federal counterpart, but those
decisions far from reflect a fundamental shift in thinking about state constitutional interpretation. As
early as 1961, in City of Portland v. Welch, n87 the Oregon Supreme Court held that it was "self
evident" that local police censorship of commercial films violated article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution and that, "although we rely upon our own constitution," it was clear that such
censorship violated the Federal Constitution as well. n88 But five years later, in Minielly v. State,
n89 the court addressed an argument predicated on both state and federal constitutional guarantees
of freedom of expression by reference to federal court decisions concerning the First Amendment
alone. n90
Similarly, in 1976, in State v. Olsen, n91 the court declined to employ the fundamental rights
component of existing Fourteenth Amendment case law to a challenge brought under article I,
section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. The court acknowledged that "we have repeatedly and
explicitly held or unequivocally inferred that the scope of the equal protection clause of the Oregon
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment is the same." n92 It nevertheless announced "this does
not mean that we cannot decide that the equal protection clause of the Oregon Constitution is
broader than that of the Federal Constitution." n93 In declining to incorporate all of the federal
equal protection analysis, the court offered no independent analysis of the language or history of the
relevant provisions of the state constitution. The court merely cited the analysis of a New Jersey
[*820]  decision on similar facts, which it stated it found satisfactory. n94 That the Olsen decision
signaled no significant shift in analysis is demonstrated by the court's decision in City of Klamath
Falls v. Winters n95 in 1980. In that case the court explained that, although
[it] is true that the provisions of article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution are
not identical with those of the Fourteenth Amendment ... in the usual case
substantially the same analysis is applicable in determining whether there has been a
denial of equal protection of the laws or a grant of a privilege or immunity on terms
not equally applicable to all citizens. n96
The significance of such cases should not be underestimated. They reflect a transition period in
the thinking of the court, during which it gradually grew to accept the possibility that, at least in
some instances, there might be opportunities for state constitutional provisions to have independent
significance. The late 1970s, in fact, produced an increasing number of decisions in which the court
openly entertained - if ultimately to sidestep - the possibility. Thus, for example, in the City of
Klamath Falls decision, the court suggests that "in the usual case substantially the same analysis"
applies to state and federal equal protection guarantees, leaving open the possibility that the court
could carve out exceptions in unusual cases. n97
A key factor in this transition appears to have been the publication of Hans Linde's law review
article, Without "Due Process." n98 In that important article, then-professor Linde suggested that
state and federal constitutional provisions that for years had been treated as identical might more
properly be regarded as distinct on the basis of differences in text and enactment history. n99
[*821]  In particular, Linde assailed the Oregon Supreme Court's cases holding that the state
guaranty of a remedy for wrongs committed, expressed in article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution, constituted a state version of the Federal Due Process Clauses of the Federal
Constitution. In making his argument, Linde cited textual differences, including the fact that article
I, section 10 makes no mention of the words "due process," and the distinct historical sources for
the state and federal clauses.
The Oregon Supreme Court at first seems to have regarded Linde's point as having merely
academic significance. In its 1974 decision in School District No. 12 v. Wasco County, n100 the
court commented that the due process claim based on article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution was ill-founded, because "Professor Linde demonstrates that this section is not a due
process provision, but, rather, has to do with the protection of legal remedies  [*822]  which assert
interests recognized in tort law." n101 The court nevertheless concluded that Linde's demonstration
was beside the point, "because when this court has treated article I, section 10, as a due process
clause, it has shown no inclination to treat it substantially different from the federal interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment." n102
But before long, the court began to warm to the broader significance of Linde's argument.
Although it continued to treat state and federal constitutional provisions as equivalents, it held out
the possibility - usually with a citation to Without "Due Process" - that such might not always be the
case. Thus, for example, in State v. Ivory, n103 the court held that, although it had determined to
adopt the federal speedy trial analysis in a case brought under the state constitution, "it may be that
an interpretation of a comparable Oregon constitutional provision which differs from the view taken
by the Supreme Court of similar federal constitutional language would be appropriate in some
cases." n104 Similarly, in State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, n105 the court held that although state and
federal equal protection provisions are not identical, it was appropriate to apply the federal analysis.
n106 In a footnote, the court noted: "For examples of cases in which the applicability of article I,
section 20 and the Equal Protection Clause might not be identical, see Linde, Without 'Due
Process.'" n107
The significance of the 1970s decisions, and Linde's article, should not be overestimated,
however. The fact remains that,  [*823]  throughout the decade, the court still clung to its practice of
treating state and federal constitutional provisions as essentially fungible. It should be recalled that
the City of Klamath Falls case was published in 1980, ten years after the publication of Without
"Due Process" and a full two years after Linde was sworn in as a member of the Oregon Supreme
Court.
Change did come, but with a marked lack of fanfare. In retrospect it is striking, in fact, how the
court so nonchalantly embarked on what later would be referred to as its constitutional "revolution."
In some cases, the nonchalance came easily, because there was little or no prior case law to impede
the independent construction of the state constitution. In State v. Kessler, n108 for example, perhaps
the earliest example of the Oregon Supreme Court's new approach to state constitutional
construction, the court confronted a challenge brought under article I, section 27, of the Oregon
Constitution, which guarantees the right to bear arms. The court began by observing that the scope
of the provision previously had not been analyzed by the Oregon courts. Decisions construing the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court said, "are not particularly helpful"
because the wording of the federal provision "differs substantially from our state provision," and, in
any event, the Second Amendment had not yet been held to apply to the states. n109 Whereupon,
the court embarked on an extended analysis of the historical background and textual significance of
Oregon's differently worded constitutional guarantee. n110 I leave for later discussion the
particulars of the court's analysis. n111 Suffice it to say at this juncture that it was distinctly
different from the existing case law construing the Second Amendment. n112
In other cases, the nonchalance was no less present, but it was  [*824]  rather more difficult to
pull off. In such cases, substantial precedent did exist that called for uniform construction of state
and federal constitutional provisions, and the court was forced to employ some artful maneuvers to
produce the impression that it was keeping with prior practice. Illustrative is the court's opinion in
State v. Clark, n113 a 1981 case in which the criminal defendant challenged the constitutionality of
a state law that afforded those charged by district attorney information with a preliminary hearing
but not those charged by grand jury indictment. The defendant, charged by grand jury indictment
and denied a preliminary hearing, argued that, among other things, the statute violated his
constitutional right to equal protection. n114 In his brief on appeal, the defendant did not cite article
I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, but rather relied on the Fourteenth Amendment. n115
The Oregon Supreme Court nevertheless declared that, because the defendant did not "spell out
the distinct premises" of his equal protection attack, it was free to examine the application of the
Oregon Constitution before turning to any federal constitutional analysis. n116 Indeed, the court
commented in a footnote that it was required to do so. n117 Interestingly, the only authority the
court could muster for that assertion was a case in which the court had held that state statutory
claims always must be disposed of before examining constitutional claims. n118 It was clear
[*825]  that, in Clark, the court was on a mission, and it was not going to let the briefing of the
parties get in the way.
The court then launched into an analysis of the language and history of article I, section 20, of
the Oregon Constitution. n119 Again, I leave for later discussion the particulars of the court's new
analysis, but, as in Kessler, the court's analysis of the state constitution in Clark was wholly distinct
from the traditional equal protection analysis that had been developed by the federal courts under
the Fourteenth Amendment. n120 What is important to note at this point is how the court attempted
to demonstrate that it was doing nothing new. Indeed, it relied on an 1891 decision, the earliest to
construe article I, section 20, and then declared that the analysis it described "has thus been clear
from the earliest judicial discussion of article I, section 20 ...." n121 However, the court failed to
note that the 1891 decision itself relied on, and quoted extensively from, federal court decisions
construing the Fourteenth Amendment. n122 The court did mention its prior cases, but only in
passing and casting them in an entirely new light:
This court often has stated that for most purposes analysis under article I, section 20,
and under the Federal Equal Protection Clause will coincide, although of course a
law found to be invalid under article I, section 20, would not also be tested under the
Federal Constitution. n123
The court cited School District No. 12 and Savage, but, of course, neither case said anything
about the primacy of state constitutional analysis. That much was utterly unprecedented. Thus, as
with the briefing of the parties, a determined court was not  [*826]  about to let prior case law stand
in the way of its new mission: to determine the meaning of the Oregon Constitution independent of
- indeed, before even considering - any federal constitutional analysis.
Clark was no aberration, either. Within the space of a few short years, the court took the same
approach in determining the meaning of Oregon's constitutional provisions concerning free speech,
n124 free exercise of religion, n125 search and seizure, n126 and remedies for wrongs committed,
n127 among others. Indeed, as early as 1986, one member of the court went so far as to proclaim
that "I should like to think that the Oregon Constitutional Revolution has been accomplished. The
primacy of our state's constitution, so long neglected, is now accepted by all." n128 What remains
to be examined is precisely how the court has gone about assigning meaning to the Oregon
Constitution since the advent of the "Oregon Constitutional Revolution." It is that subject that is the
focus of the remainder of this article.
B. After the Revolution: The Methodologies of Oregon Constitutionalism
In embarking on its constitutional "revolution," the Oregon Supreme Court invoked no
particular interpretive theory. In some cases, the court noted distinct differences between the texts
of parallel federal and state constitutional provisions. In other cases, the court relied on textual
differences and differences in the historical context of the adoption of the various constitutional
texts. In still other cases, the court appeared not to consider the text or the history of a state
constitutional provision at all, but rather relied on the basic structure of the constitution or on
political theories that only incidentally related to the wording or the history of the constitutional
provision at issue. For the first decade of the revolution, the court seemed content to focus on
constructing an independent constitutional jurisprudence, without devoting much attention to the
manner in which it arrived at that result.
Ultimately, however, the court became more self-conscious  [*827]  about interpretive
methodology, at least ostensibly so. In 1992, it announced a methodology that, on its face, appears
applicable to all provisions of the state constitution. It requires examination of the text of a given
provision, its enactment history, and any prior case law construing it. It is overtly originalist in
orientation.
The court has applied the methodology in a number of cases. But in a surprising number of
cases it has not. In particular, the court has declined to apply its originalist orientation to any
provision that already has been subject to interpretation by some other means. Instead, the court has
continued to rely on a rather wide variety of interpretive approaches in giving independent meaning
to the Oregon Constitution. By my count, there are at least six distinctly different interpretive
strategies that the court has employed in its interpretation of the state constitution.
1. Interpretation as Archeology: Originalism
The predominant interpretive approach reflected in Oregon appellate case law unquestionably is
traditional originalism. The practice of construing the Oregon Constitution to reflect the meaning
originally intended at the time of enactment dates back at least to the 1863 case of Noland v.
Costello. n129 In Noland, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute
that increased the jurisdictional authority of justices of the peace to $ 250 from $ 100, the
jurisdictional level that existed in the territory before statehood. The constitution provided that
justices of the peace may be invested with "limited" authority. n130 It was argued that the reference
to "limited" suggested that justices of the peace have no greater authority than what existed at the
time the constitution was adopted. The court rejected the argument by reasoning that "if the framers
of the constitution had intended to limit them to one hundred dollars, they could and certainly would
have used different and more appropriate language to embody their intention." n131
 [*828]  In the following century, the court routinely invoked the intentions of the framers to
justify one interpretation or another. Perhaps the best example is the court's 1936 decision in Jory v.
Martin. n132 At issue was the constitutionality of a legislatively enacted pay raise for the governor.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution provided that "the governor shall receive an
annual salary of fifteen hundred dollars." n133 In 1930, the Legislative Assembly enacted a law that
provided for a raise to the then-considerable sum of $ 7,500. n134 A taxpayer who thought that $
1,500 was quite enough challenged the legislation, arguing that it found no authority in the state
constitution.
The court first looked to the text of the provision and observed that nothing in it expressly
prohibited the legislature from enhancing the governor's salary. The court then turned to the
enactment history of article XIII, section 1, to ascertain whether the framers nevertheless intended
such a prohibition. The court quickly concluded that they did not:
That they did not so intend clearly appears from the proceedings of the convention,
as shown by the Journal of the Constitutional Convention .... It appears from these
published reports of the proceedings of the convention that, while section 1 of article
XIII was being considered, Mr. John C. Peebles, a member from Marion county,
moved to amend, by adding to the end of the section the following words:
"Provided, further, That the salaries of the judges shall not be subject to increase,
and the salaries of the Governor and Secretary shall never exceed two thousand
dollars nor that of the Treasurer exceed twelve hundred dollars."
and that this proposed amendment was rejected. It further shows that on the same
day, Mr. William H. Packwood, a member from Curry county,
"moved to amend section 1, on salaries, by striking out all after the word 'offices,'
in fifth line, and insert the words 'nor shall the pay of any officer in this state be
diminished or increased,  [*829]  except as provided for in the first section for the
making of amendments to this constitution;' which was disagreed to."
It will thus be seen that the question of whether section 1 of article XIII, as
framed by the convention and as adopted by the people, would have the effect of
prohibiting the legislature from increasing these salaries was considered by the
framers and that they were of the opinion that it did not have that effect and that,
since the proceedings of the convention were published in the two then leading
newspapers of the state, the Oregon Statesman and the Oregonian, it would seem to
follow that the people, in adopting the constitution, were of the same opinion and
intended to leave the matter of increasing these salaries, whenever a necessity
therefor should arise, to the discretion of the legislature. n135
Thus, the court resorted to the records of the constitutional convention to determine whether the
drafters of the provision originally intended it to bar future increases.
The court did not stop there, however. It noted that, in 1887, a controversy had erupted over the
constitutionality of a proposed salary increase for judges, whose salaries likewise were prescribed
by article XIII, section 1. n136 The legislature had solicited opinions from various members of the
original constitutional convention of 1857 and, the court noted, each of the opinions that were
submitted supported the authority of the legislature to enact legislation increasing judicial salaries:
All the men whose opinions are quoted above sat in the convention which framed
the constitution, all were regarded as among the ablest lawyers of the state ....
Manifestly, no other persons at that time were better qualified to express an opinion
as to the meaning of the constitution, or could speak more authoritatively, than these
men, and, therefore, their opinions upon the very question which we are now called
upon to decide ought not lightly to be disregarded. While it is true ... that the
constitution derives its force from the people who ratified it and not from the
convention which framed it, yet these proceedings of the convention and the
opinions of the men who took a leading part in framing the constitution are of great
value in interpreting the meaning of the constitution .... n137
The court did not stop there, either. The court further observed that in the legislative sessions of
1860, 1862, and 1864, the Legislative Assembly enacted provisions for the governor to receive
[*830]  per diem, mileage, and related travel expenses in addition to his regular salary. n138 Not
only that, the court noted, in 1893, 1895, and 1905, the legislature enacted outright salary increases
for the governor without constitutional challenge. n139
From all that historical exegesis, the court concluded:
The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to
the intention of the people in adopting it and when any particular provision of the
constitution has received a practical construction for a period of 76 years ... and such
construction has been acquiesced in by the people for that whole period, the court
should not apply a different construction to that provision unless its
unconstitutionality is established beyond all reasonable doubt. n140
The decision reveals an unmistakable commitment to ascertaining the actual, subjective
intentions of those who framed the constitution and, by implication, of the people who enacted it
into law.
In many of its post-revolution decisions concerning provisions of the Oregon Constitution that
are patterned after, or textually similar to, provisions of the Federal Constitution, the court has
exhibited a similar commitment to ascertaining how such provisions were understood by the
framers or the people in 1857.
An early example is the court's decision in State v. Kessler, n141 in which the court confronted
the question whether a statute prohibiting the possession of a billy club violated the constitutional
guarantee of the people's "right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves, and the State,"
contained in article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution. n142 The court began its analysis of
the provision by openly declaring its commitment to an originalist interpretive strategy:
We are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the wisdom of a right to
bear arms, and that the original motivations for such a provision might not seem
compelling if debated as a new issue. Our task, however, in construing a
constitutional provision is to respect the principles given the status of constitutional
guarantees and limitations by the drafters; it is not to abandon these principles when
this fits the  [*831]  needs of the moment. n143
It then embarked on a history of article I, section 27, tracing its origin to the Indiana
Constitution of 1851, which borrowed from the constitutions of Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Pennsylvania, significant portions of which were patterned after the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
n144 From its historical analysis, the court traced the constitutional language to the English and
colonial American fear that standing armies might be used to oppress an unarmed populace as well
as a concern of frontier society for personal safety. n145
From that conclusion, the court reasoned that the "arms" citizens are guaranteed the right to
possess are those weapons that would have been used by early settlers for both personal and
military defense. n146 The court noted that, in the colonial and revolutionary war era, colonists
usually were armed with a single gun that was used for hunting, protection, and militia duty, as well
as a hatchet, sword, and knife. n147 Thus, the court concluded, the right to bear "arms" is not
limited to firearms, but includes hand-carried weapons used for defense. Clubs are just such hand-
carried weapons, the court then declared. Indeed, the court said, clubs were among the first weapons
of personal safety, and their use continues to the present day. Finding no principled basis on which
to distinguish clubs from the sort of hand-carried weapons of personal safety that the colonists
routinely used, the court concluded that the possession of such a weapon was constitutionally
protected:
Our historical analysis of article I, section 27, indicates that the drafters intended
'arms' to include the hand-carried weapons commonly used by individuals for
personal defense. The club is an effective, hand-carried weapon which cannot
logically be excluded from this term. n148
A few years later, in State v. Delgado, n149 the court returned to the subject of the right to bear
"arms" under article I, section 27. This time, the question involved the impact of technological
improvements to weaponry that have taken place since the time of  [*832]  the framing of the
constitutional right. The defendant was charged with carrying a switchblade knife, in violation of
state law. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing that, under article I,
section 27, of the Oregon Constitution, he had the right to bear such an "arm" for his personal
safety. The state argued that a switchblade is not a weapon commonly used for personal defense and
therefore is not an "arm" within the meaning of article I, section 27. n150
Citing its opinion in Kessler, the court framed the issue in the following terms:
The appropriate inquiry in the case at bar is whether a kind of weapon, as
modified by its modern design and function, is of the sort commonly used by
individuals for personal defense during either the revolutionary and post-
revolutionary era, or in 1859 when Oregon's constitution was adopted. In particular,
it must be determined whether the drafters would have intended the word "arms" to
include the switch-blade knife as a weapon commonly used by individuals for self
defense. n151
To answer that question, the court said, required resort to the history of knives. Whereupon the
court briefly recounted the history of the "fighting knife," from Roman times through the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance to early colonial and nineteenth-century America. n152 On the basis of
its historical analysis, the court concluded:
It is clear, then, that knives have played an important role in American life, both
as tools and as weapons. The folding pocketknife, in particular, since the early 18th
century has been commonly carried by men in America and used primarily for work,
but also for fighting. n153
The real issue, the court then said, was whether the spring operation of the switchblade renders
it so different from its historical antecedent that it could not have been within the contemplation of
the constitutional drafters. n154 The court quickly responded that the framers
must have been aware that technological changes were occurring in weaponry as in
tools generally. The format and efficiency of weaponry was proceeding apace. This
was the  [*833]  period of development of the Gatling gun, breach loading rifles,
metallic cartridges and repeating rifles. The addition of a spring to open the blade of
a jackknife is hardly a more astonishing innovation than those just mentioned. n155
Thus, the court concluded, the switchblade was indeed the sort of weapon that the framers of the
Oregon Constitution would have contemplated as being used for self defense, and the statute
prohibiting possession of the weapons therefore was unconstitutional. n156
In 1992, the Oregon Supreme Court more or less formalized its originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation in Priest v. Pearce. n157 As usual, the court did so with little fanfare. It
simply announced that the proper method of analyzing the meaning of a provision of the Oregon
Constitution consists of three steps, namely, analysis of "its specific wording, the case law
surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation." n158 Interestingly, although
Priest has since come to be cited as the leading case for the three-step historical analysis of
constitutional provisions, n159 history proved not very helpful in resolving the particular
interpretive problem debated in that case.
The specific issue in Priest was whether the right to bail guaranteed by article I, section 14, of
the Oregon Constitution, applied during the pendency of an appeal by an individual convicted of a
crime other than murder or treason. Article I, section 14, provides that "offences [sic], except
murder, and treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason, shall not be bailable,
when the proof is evident, or the presumption  [*834]  strong." n160 The court began its analysis
with the text of the provision, reasoning that, although the first sentence stated in unqualified terms
a right to bail, the second sentence - referring as it does to "evident" proof or strongly presumed
guilt - suggests that the provision applies only to pretrial detention. n161 Indeed, the court went so
far as to say that the second sentence "becomes meaningless" if the right applies during the
pendency of an appeal: "When a court or jury has found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, proof
hardly can be said to be other than 'evident;' the presumption of guilt hardly can be said to be other
than 'strong.'" n162 Although the answer seemed clear enough from the text, the court turned to the
second and third steps of its analysis, but it found neither case law nor any evidence of the framers'
intentions from the usual historical sources. n163 The court then simply concluded that, because
nothing in the case law or the enactment history of article I, section 14, controverted what the text
suggested, the section cannot be read to guarantee a right to bail during the pendency of an appeal.
n164
Since 1992, the three-step methodology of Priest has shaped the court's analysis of the intended
meaning of various provisions of the Oregon Constitution. Although the analysis is broken down
into distinct steps, the ultimate goal remains historical, that is, ascertaining the meaning of the
provision at issue as understood by the mid-nineteenth century framers. Lakin v. Senco Products,
Inc., n165 is a good example.
In Lakin, the court addressed whether a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in a civil
negligence action violated the constitutional right to a jury trial provided in article I, section 17, of
the Oregon Constitution. The constitution provides that, "in all civil cases," the right to a jury trial
"shall remain inviolate." n166 The court framed the issue as required in Priest: "In analyzing the
meaning of a provision of the Oregon Constitution, this court looks to the specific wording of the
provision, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its  [*835]
enactment." n167
The court began with the text of article I, section 17, commenting in clearly originalist terms:
No party questions that this is a civil case or that plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial
for their claims. No party argues that "inviolate" has a different meaning today than
it did when article I, section 17, was adopted in 1857 as part of the original Oregon
Constitution. Thus, for purposes of this case, whatever the right to a jury trial in a
civil case meant in 1857, it has the same meaning today. n168
Finding nothing in the text of article I, section 17, that provided the answer, the court turned to
the relevant case law. That, too, proved less than helpful, for the cases cited stood for no more than
the general proposition that the constitution guarantees a jury trial in those classes of cases in which
there was a right to a jury trial at the time of its adoption. n169
The court then turned to the historical circumstances that led to the enactment of article I,
section 17. The court recounted the history of the right to a jury trial generally from its first mention
in the Magna Carta to its development at English common law, and the adoption of the common
law by the American colonies. The court also detailed the extent to which the right to a jury trial
was guaranteed in early Oregon territorial enactments and described how the text of the
constitutional provision found its sources in the constitutions of Indiana and Ohio. n170 From that
information, the court concluded
that the framers of the Oregon Constitution clearly understood the meaning of the
right to [a] jury trial in a civil case and that they intended that that right would
remain "inviolate," i.e., secure against violation or impairment, in the new State of
Oregon. It follows, therefore, that whatever the right to "Trial by Jury" meant in
1857, it means precisely the same thing today. n171
That meant, the court said, that the determinative question is whether the assessment of damages
was something that the framers would have understood to have been a function of a jury. Turning
once again to historical sources, the court observed that,  [*836]  indeed, the determination of the
amount of damages to be awarded in a civil action was considered to be within the exclusive
province of the jury at the time of the adoption of article I, section 17. Consequently, the court
concluded, legislation limiting the amount of damages the jury may award in a civil case cannot be
reconciled with the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial. n172
In subsequent cases, the Oregon courts have applied the same originalist analysis to a variety of
other provisions of the state constitution, including the prohibition against ex post facto laws, n173
the grand jury quorum requirement, n174 the separate vote requirement for constitutional
amendments, n175 and the one-subject limitation on legislative enactments. n176 In each case, the
court attempted to ascertain constitutional meaning by discovering what the framers would have
intended or would have understood a provision to mean at the time of the adoption of the
constitution.
A few things must be said about the manner in which the Oregon courts have engaged in their
originalist analysis of the state constitution. First, the Oregon courts have never explained why
originalism is appropriate in the first place. It certainly is not the only interpretive possibility.
Indeed, as I have mentioned, judicial attempts to reconstruct constitutional meaning by resort to
historical materials have been the subject of sustained criticism for decades. The Oregon courts
seem unaware of the criticism, however. In no case of which I am aware has any Oregon court
attempted to defend the legitimacy of originalist constitutional interpretation. Its legitimacy is taken
for granted.
Second, the proper focus of the Oregon courts' originalism is not entirely clear. In particular, the
courts appear to have some difficulty identifying whose intentions are to be ascertained.
Theoretically, if anyone's intentions should be controlling, it should be those who enacted the
constitution into law, namely the people. The intentions of the framers, that is, the drafters of the
constitution at the 1857 convention, should be beside the point. n177 Yet most opinions that refer to
original "intentions" do  [*837]  so with respect to those who drafted the constitution, as reflected
by the records of the convention of 1857. This is understandable as it is much easier to find records
of the convention than it is to reconstruct what the people likely understood the constitution to mean
in 1857. But it is still difficult to justify. In a few - surprisingly older - opinions, the court has
acknowledged the problem. In Monaghan v. School District No. 1, n178 for example, the court
resorted to records of the constitutional convention concerning the drafting of a particular provision.
Almost apologetically, the court explained that although
[t]he constitution derives its force and effect from the people who ratified it and not
from the proceedings of the convention where it was framed, ... we are permitted to
consider some of the circumstances, conditions and personalities present at that time
as a source of help but not as a matter necessarily conclusive upon our own
judgment. n179
Similarly, in Jory v. Martin, n180 an even older case, the court justified its citations to the
convention by reasoning that, because the proceedings of the convention were published in two
leading newspapers in Salem and Portland, "it would seem to follow that the people, in adopting the
constitution, were of the same opinion" as was expressed at the convention. n181
Third, in a related vein, there seems to be some vagueness about what precisely constitutes the
"history" of a constitutional provision. Tethered to no particular vision of whose intentions are
controlling, the opinions appear to range far and wide in their sources in determining the historical
facts. Sources range from the Magna Carta, n182 to Blackstone's Commentaries, n183 to Charles
[*838]  Dickens novels. n184 The connection to the intentions of the framers sometimes can be
quite attenuated.
Sometimes the court will also employ fictions to bridge the gap between the historical record
and the framers. In State v. Cookman, n185 for example, the court addressed the meaning of article
I, section 21, the state ex post facto clause. The court found little help in the record of the 1857
convention. It did discover that the Oregon provision was patterned after a similar provision in the
1851 Indiana Constitution, which, in turn, was substantially similar to a provision in the 1816
Indiana Constitution. n186 The court then turned to an 1822 decision of the Indiana Supreme Court
construing the ex post facto clause of the 1816 Indiana Constitution. n187 The court found the
opinion both instructive and relevant, because it was "a decision that was available to the framers of
the Oregon Constitution when they decided to adopt the Indiana ex post facto provision in our state
constitution." n188 The court made no reference to the extent to which the case actually was known
to anyone in the 1857 convention or to whether a copy of the decision even existed in Oregon at the
time. n189 The court was content to employ a fiction that it was entitled to rely on the 1822 Indiana
decision as evidence of the intentions of the framers of the Oregon Constitution because
theoretically it was "available," having been decided some years earlier, regardless of whether the
framers actually knew about the decision.
Fourth, there is also some lack of clarity as to how the courts  [*839]  decide the level of
specificity with which they will describe original intentions. That is, the same set of historical facts
in any given case may give rise to any number of different levels of generalization, each of which is
perfectly consistent with the historical facts. n190 For an excellent illustration, consider the right to
bear arms cases.
The Oregon Supreme Court has concluded that, in guaranteeing the right to bear "arms," the
state constitution protects only the "sort" of weapons that would have been used by the framers for
their personal or military defense. Precisely how is a court to determine whether a modern-day
weapon is the "sort" of weapon that the framers would have used? Necessarily, the answer entails
examining the historical record to determine the nature of weaponry in the early-to mid-nineteenth
century. However, any number of generalizations legitimately may be derived from examination of
that record.
That very problem surfaced in an Oregon Court of Appeals decision, Oregon State Shooting
Ass'n v. Multnomah County, n191 in which the court was required to determine the constitutionality
of a local ordinance that prohibited the public possession of "assault weapons" such as semi-
automatic rifles. Obviously, semi-automatic rifles did not exist in 1857. The question for the court
was, in light of Kessler and Delgado, whether such weapons would have been used by the framers.
A majority of the court, sitting en banc, examined the historical record and concluded that semi-
automatic rifles were not the "sort" of arms that the framers would have used in the mid-nineteenth
century. n192  [*840]  The majority noted that, although repeating firearms had been produced by
1857, they were primitive at best and not widely available. n193 In his dissent, Judge Walter
Edmonds complained that the historical record showed that repeating rifles were available, although
not commonly possessed, and that, therefore, the record was sufficient to demonstrate that the
framers would have considered them the "sort" of weapons to which the protection of article I,
section 27, applied. n194
The difference between the two opinions lay not in a disagreement about the state of the
historical record. Both agreed that repeating rifles were available, but not commonly possessed. The
source of the disagreement lay in the articulation of what that historical record showed. In truth, that
is likely a problem in any case in which conclusions are being drawn from a historical record. But
the problem seems especially obvious in the case of originalist constitutional interpretation. And the
Oregon courts appear not to have noticed it.
2. Doctrinal "Interpretation": Free Expression and the Oregon Constitution
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides that "no law shall be passed restraining
the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." n195 Given the long
tradition of originalist interpretation of the Oregon Constitution, it would seem fair to assume that
the Oregon courts would ascertain the meaning of the provision by examining the historical record
for evidence of what the framers would have intended. That is not what the courts have done,
however.
The Oregon Supreme Court did flirt with such an approach in a 1960 decision, State v. Jackson,
n196 in which the court addressed the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting the creation and
distribution of obscene materials. The defendant argued that the statute amounted to a prior
restraint, in violation of article I, section 8. The court began by indulging in a brief history of state
regulation of speech, noting that two currents of thought existed  [*841]  on the matter. On the one
hand, the court explained, the English regarded free speech with no particular sanctity; indeed, the
press was regarded as an "instrument of mischief." n197 On the other hand, the court continued,
there was a strong reaction to censorship borne of the seventeenth-century licensing acts. n198
There resulted a general sentiment crystallized in Blackstone's Commentaries:
In this, and other instances which we have lately considered, where blasphemous,
immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by
the English law, some with a greater, others with a less degree of severity; the liberty
of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated. The liberty of
the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments
he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but
if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity. n199
Thus, the court commented, at English common law, there developed a distinction between the
prior restraint of publication and the punishment for the publication after the fact. The former was
regarded as unlawful; the latter was not. n200
The court noted that, although Blackstone's characterization of the law had been subjected to
substantial, even "persuasive," criticism, article I, section 8, "appears to adopt the formula of the
Commentaries." n201 The text of the provision does consist of two clauses, one prohibiting
"restraint" of free expression, and the other permitting punishment for "abuse" of the right. Having
arrived at that conclusion, however, the court then retreated. The statute at issue did not really
impose a prior restraint. Accordingly, the court concluded that it was not really necessary to
determine the meaning and applicability of article I, section 8. n202
Coincidentally, the year that the Oregon Supreme Court decided Jackson was the same year that
Leonard Levy published his ground-breaking study of the history of free speech, Legacy  [*842]  of
Suppression. n203 In that study, Levy laid waste to the romantic, but ahistorical, claims of early-
twentieth-century writers that the framers of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression
intended broadly to wipe out the common law of sedition and any penalties for the free expression
of opinions of any sort. n204 To the contrary, Levy concluded, what the framers most likely had in
mind was the common law, as characterized by Blackstone in his Commentaries; that is to say, the
framers most likely intended constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech to prohibit prior
restraint - censorship - but not the imposition of civil or criminal penalties for publication after the
fact. n205
But the Supreme Court never followed up on the dictum of Jackson concerning the intended
scope of article I, section 8. Nor has the court ever addressed the significance of Levy's research or
the research of others since 1960 either confirming or challenging the thesis that the framers
probably understood the First Amendment and contemporaneous state constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression to accomplish little more than what was reflected in the common law.
Instead, in its 1982 decision in State v. Robertson, n206 the court assigned a meaning to the clause
that only tangentially related to its intended meaning by the framers in the mid-nineteenth century.
Indeed, the meaning assigned to the clause bore only a superficial relationship to  [*843]  the text of
article I, section 8. What the court substituted was a "doctrine" of free expression developed largely
independent of the text and history of article I, section 8. As it turns out, the doctrine was developed
as a proposed method of analysis of cases arising under the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.
At issue in Robertson was the constitutionality of a statute that made it a crime to coerce another
person "to engage in conduct from which he has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain from engaging
in conduct which he has a legal right to engage" by means of threats of publishing some private fact
about the person. n207 Specifically, the defendant challenged it as unconstitutionally overbroad.
n208 Responding to the challenge, the Oregon Supreme Court articulated, in an entirely novel
fashion, the scope of the protection that article I, section 8, affords against overbroad enactments. In
doing so, however, the court did not announce it was embarking on a new course in the construction
of the constitution. Rather, in a fashion that is by now familiar, the court simply described its new
construction of article I, section 8, as if it always had been so, with a nonchalance that, in retrospect,
seems startling. Indeed, the Robertson analysis, later articulated as a neat, multi-part formula, n209
was not described as such in the Robertson opinion itself. Instead, the various pieces of the formula
appear sprinkled throughout the opinion, almost as asides.
With Justice Linde writing, the court began by describing the problem of overbreadth in general
terms, comparing and contrasting it with the problem of unconstitutional vagueness:
When a statute is attacked as vague, for failing to define and communicate its
coverage, the statute sometimes can be saved by a judicial interpretation that gives it
the required definiteness. It is the court's obligation to do so when this can be done
without departing too far from what the legislature sought to accomplish or what the
statute itself can convey to a reader. But when such a saving construction cannot be
attributed to the legislature with reasonable fidelity to the legislature's  [*844]  words
and apparent intent, the statute is invalid as enacted, and it is immaterial whether the
particular case in which it is challenged would be immune from a validly drawn law.
A narrowing construction similarly may save a statute attacked as "overbroad,"
unless the constitutional guarantee invoked against the statute forbade its very
enactment as drafted. Article I, section 8, for instance, forbids lawmakers to pass any
law "restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write,
or print freely on any subject whatever," beyond providing a remedy for any person
injured by the "abuse" of this right. This forecloses the enactment of any law written
in terms directed to the substance of any "opinion" or any "subject" of
communication, unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some
historical exception that was well established when the first American guarantees of
freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859
demonstrably were not intended to reach. Examples are perjury, solicitation or verbal
assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud and their contemporary
variants. n210
Further describing the law concerning overbreadth, the court continued:
That an offense includes the use of words is not in itself fatal to the enactment of a
prohibition in terms directed at causing harm rather than against words as such.
Communication is an element in many traditional crimes. As stated above, article I,
section 8, prohibits lawmakers from enacting restrictions that focus on the content of
speech or writing, either because that content itself is deemed socially undesirable or
offensive, or because it is thought to have adverse consequences.... It means that
laws must focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results
rather than on the suppression of speech or writing either as an end in itself or as a
means to some other legislative end. n211
Thus, in the course of a "for instance" aside, the court completely rewrote the law of free
expression in Oregon. First, article I, section 8, protects only speech, not forbidden results. Thus, if
a law targets a forbidden effect and incidentally restrains speech, it is constitutionally innocuous.
Second, if it targets speech either "as an end in itself or as a means to some other legislative end,"
the law will fail unless it is "wholly confined" within a "historical exception" that was "well
established" either  [*845]  at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment or at the time of the
adoption of the Oregon Constitution.
It bears emphasis that, in articulating this new conception of the rights of free expression, the
court did not engage in its usual originalist analysis. It did not trace - as did the court in Jackson -
the origins of article I, section 8, discuss the historical context within which it was enacted, or
examine the records of the constitutional convention of 1857 to determine whether such was the
construction intended by its framers. Indeed, Jackson is not once cited in the Robertson opinion. To
be sure, there is some mention of history as part of the new Robertson test - article I, section 8,
constrains any restraint on free speech unless the restraint falls wholly within a well-established
historical exception. But the Robertson court made no attempt to justify the historical exception test
itself or the otherwise absolute effect of article I, section 8, by reference to the intentions of the
framers. Likewise, the court did not attempt to justify its new analytical framework by reference to
prior cases. The fact is that there were no such cases to which the court could have referred. The
cases, Jackson in particular, could in no way be reconciled with the court's new approach.
Whence came the Robertson analysis, then? The answer to the question lies in recalling who the
author of the opinion was, namely Justice Linde. Before coming to the court in 1978, Linde had
written several law review articles concerning recent United States Supreme Court First
Amendment decisions. Among those articles was a 1970 critique of the Supreme Court's decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio. n212 In that decision, the Court held an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute
unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to draw a distinction between constitutionally protected
advocacy and "incitement to imminent lawless action." According to the Court, only when speech is
directed to such incitement "and is likely to incite or produce" such lawless action may it be the
basis for criminal prosecution. n213 In his article, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined:
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, n214 Linde challenged the Supreme Court's decision as
untenable. According to Linde, the Court's  [*846]  reading of the First Amendment in
Brandenburg, although perhaps more protective than past formulations, did not go far enough.
The linchpin of Linde's analysis was that the text of the First Amendment states a limitation on
legislative authority; it is not, in the first instance at least, an instruction to the courts as to the nature
of the rights of citizens as against their government. n215 That, said Linde, is important, because
the limitation on legislative authority contains no qualifications. Thus, there is no provision in the
First Amendment for balancing the interests of citizens against the competing interests of the
government. To the contrary, it declares that "Congress shall make no law" abridging freedom of
speech. In consequence, Linde asserted, if a legislature enacts a law directed in terms against
speech, the law violates the First Amendment:
The First Amendment invalidates any law directed in terms against some
communicative content of speech or of the press, irrespective of extrinsic
circumstances either at the time of enactment or at the time of enforcement, if the
proscribed content is of a kind which falls under any circumstances within the
meaning of the First Amendment. n216
In other words, if the subject of the legislative prohibition is "speech" within the meaning of the
First Amendment, it is prohibited, plain and simple.
That does not mean, Linde hastened to qualify, that legislatures are powerless to address the
adverse consequences of speech. What they must do is focus on those consequences and the acts,
attempts, or conspiracies that cause them. What they must not do, he insisted, is focus on the words
that are merely presumed to create the risk of such consequences:
If you proscribe particular revolutionary acts, or attempts or  [*847]  conspiracies to
commit them, then words inciting to such acts may perhaps be punishable if the
evidence shows that they create imminent serious danger. But stick to such
proscriptions; if your bill presumes the danger and directly outlaws the words
themselves, it proposes a law "abridging the freedom of speech" forbidden you by
the First Amendment. n217
The text of the First Amendment supplied the principal justification for Linde's proposed
analysis. While acknowledging that "attention to text earns only professional scorn in constitutional
law," Linde quipped, "when one of among many constitutional limitations is literally directed
against lawmaking, might the text perhaps embody a reason that even realists can respect?" n218
Linde also offered practical, political justifications. Legislation against outrageous speech, he
suggested, is difficult to repeal. When the perceived outrage has passed from public concern, there
is little impetus to clear the statute books of laws that could cause future mischief. n219 Moreover,
he argued, the analysis that he proposed has the virtue of simplicity; it is easy for legislators and
citizens to understand. n220
It is no great secret that, once a member of the Oregon Supreme Court, Linde seized upon
Robertson as an opportunity to employ his proposed First Amendment analysis. n221 The near-
absolutist approach to free speech protection, with its demand that  [*848]  legislatures focus on
effects and not speech, is unmistakably an outgrowth of the Clear and Present Danger article. The
problem, of course, is that article I, section 8, is not the First Amendment. That the court seemed not
to notice certainly is surprising. That the author of the opinion was Linde - who certainly did notice
- is ironic in the extreme. One of the country's leading proponents of state constitutionalism
essentially shoe-horned into the state constitution an analysis that was originally designed for the
Federal Constitution.
The Robertson analysis proved less easy to understand and apply than Linde had hoped.
Although simple enough in the abstract, the analysis turned out to be devilishly difficult to apply in
specific cases. The "historical exception" analysis proved especially problematic. According to
Robertson, a law directed at speech was unconstitutional unless it was "wholly contained" within an
"historical exception" that was "well established" during either the revolutionary period or the years
before statehood. n222 But because Robertson offered no explanation of the terms, and, because
there was no other textual or historical source for them, the court was forced to simply flesh them
out from case to case. What, for example, constituted a sufficiently "well-established" historical
exception? Robertson listed several examples such as fraud, perjury, solicitation, and some variants
of theft and forgery. n223 However, the court supplied no guidance as to how it arrived at that list
or how it was to be determined whether another crime appropriately could be added to the list.
Particularly in light of the possibility that the framers understood that article I, section 8, extended
no more protection than did the common law - that is to say, that the framers understood that
virtually any speech would have been subject to an historical exception, given that the constitution
prohibited only prior restraint - the search for "well-established" historical exceptions appeared
doomed from the outset.
Not surprisingly, since Robertson, the court has not identified a single "well-established"
historical exception. In State v. Moyle, n224 for example, the court addressed the constitutionality
of a state harassment statute. n225 The state asserted that the modern  [*849]  statute fell within a
well-established exception for verbal harassment that dated back at least as early as the Waltham
Black Act of 1723. The court, however, found that the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate a
"well-established" historical exception. In particular, the court noted that the Waltham Black Act
had been repealed by the time of statehood and that only a few states - not including Oregon - had
such statutes by the mid-nineteenth century. n226
In State v. Henry, n227 the court confronted the constitutionality of an obscenity statute. n228
Again, the state argued that obscenity had been the subject of state regulation for centuries, n229
and that,  [*850]  in contrast to Moyle, there was even a closely analogous Oregon territorial statute
regulating the distribution of obscene materials. n230 Nevertheless, the court found the historical
exception not sufficiently "well established."
And in Moser v. Frohnmayer, n231 the court held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited use
of automatic telemarketing devices for commercial solicitations. n232 Again, the state argued that
commercial advertisements or solicitations had been subject to state regulation for many years;
indeed, that it was not until the mid-twentieth century that anyone even had argued that commercial
solicitation was entitled to constitutional protection. n233 Nevertheless, the court concluded,
without explanation, that the historical evidence was inadequate to constitute a "well-established"
historical exception. n234 More than one commentator has complained that cases such as Moyle,
Henry, and Moser leave the distinct impression that no matter what the state of the historical record
in a given case, litigants will be in the position of the mythical Tantalus, with a "well-established"
historical exception always just out of their reach. n235
 [*851]  The court also has shown occasional discomfort with the results that would be dictated
by the strict application of the Robertson analysis. As a result, on occasion, the court has found it
necessary to create exceptions or to modify the analysis. In re Fadeley n236 is perhaps the most
obvious example of the court's creation of an exception. At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of various judicial canons that prohibit a judge from personally soliciting campaign
contributions for his or her election candidacy. n237 Oregon Supreme Court Justice Edward
Fadeley admitted that he had violated the canons but argued that the canons violated his right to free
speech guaranteed by article I, section 8. n238 The canons undeniably regulated speech. Thus,
under Robertson, they should have been unconstitutional unless wholly contained within a well-
established historical exception. But the court held otherwise.
The court certainly began its opinion in Robertson fashion: "This court has repeatedly held that
the provision means what it says: although certain harmful effects of speech may be forbidden,
restrictions aimed not at the harm but at the content of the speech itself normally are
impermissible." n239 But then it took an abrupt turn away from its precedent, commenting that "not
even article I, section 8, is absolute - there are exceptions to its sweep." n240 One such exception,
the court ultimately held, was occasioned by the qualifying effect of a competing constitutional
provision that authorized the Oregon Supreme Court to discipline judges for violating rules of
judicial conduct. n241 In any  [*852]  event, the court added, sometimes the right to speak, write, or
print freely on any subject must be balanced against larger public interests, as in the case of the
public interest in regulating certain professions, such as judges. n242 The decision is startlingly
inconsistent with Robertson and its conceptual underpinnings as Justice Linde had articulated them.
n243
An example of the court's modification of the Robertson analysis can be found in State v.
Stoneman. n244 At issue in that case was the constitutionality of a state statute that outlawed the
purchase or possession of child pornography. n245 By its terms, the statute was directed at free
expression; the content of books, photos, or films determined the extent to which their purchase or
possession would give rise to criminal liability. Under the uncompromising analysis described in
Robertson, the statute would be unconstitutional unless it was wholly contained within a well-
established historical exception. Of course, the court's prior historical exception cases - particularly
Henry - suggest that the court was not likely to find an exception applicable to the child
pornography statute. Thus, it would be expected that the court would have found the statute
unconstitutional.
But that is neither the analysis that the court applied nor the result that it reached. As in Fadeley,
the court began its opinion  [*853]  by invoking Robertson and proclaiming "the breadth of our
state's constitutional guarantee of free expression." n246 The court then assumed that the statute
proscribed certain forms of expression and addressed whether it was wholly contained within a
well-established historical exception. With a citation to Henry, the court quickly concluded that it
was not. n247 The court did not stop there, however.
At that point, the court recanted its assumption that the statute was directed at speech. The real
focus of the statute, the court held, was the prevention of harm to children. n248 The fact that the
statute did not explicitly say that proved no impediment to the court's conclusion. The production of
child pornography, the court reasoned, "necessarily involves harm to children." n249 Therefore, by
prohibiting commerce in such material, the legislature implicitly had set its sights on harmful
effects, not speech. n250 That, of course, is a substantial modification of the original Robertson
analysis, the very heart of which was the principle that, to avoid the broad protective sweep of
article I, section 8, legislatures were required explicitly to focus on harmful effects, not speech.
Under Stoneman, the focus on harmful effects need not be explicit; it may be inferred. That is not
much different from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburg, the criticism of
which - ironically - gave birth to the analysis adopted in Robertson in the first place. n251
 [*854]   
3. Interpretation by Implication: The Right to Gather Intiative Petition Signatures on Private
Property
Free expression is not the only area in which the Oregon courts have departed from the
originalist interpretive methodology of Priest. In cases construing other provisions of the Oregon
Constitution, the courts likewise have given no attention to original intent. But, unlike the
Robertson line of cases, the courts have not relied on a free-standing doctrine either. In these cases,
the courts have inferred that certain specific constitutional rights or limitations necessarily follow
from a given constitutional provision, regardless of whether the text of the provision actually says
anything one way or the other.
The principal case in point is the Oregon Supreme Court's controversial opinion in Lloyd Corp.
v. Whiffen. n252 The issue was whether the owner of a large shopping center could constitutionally
be required to allow private citizens to gather initiative petition signatures on shopping center
property. The Lloyd Corporation owned a large shopping center, the "Lloyd Center." When certain
private citizens insisted on soliciting initiative petition signatures at the Lloyd Center, the owner
applied to the court for an injunction to prevent such activity from occurring on its property. n253
The defendant signature gatherers argued that they had a constitutional right, secured by article IV,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, to collect initiative petition signatures on private property.
n254
Article IV, section 1, reserves to the people the power to enact laws by initiative and referendum
and prescribes in general terms the enactment process:
(1) The legislative power of the state, except for the initiative and referendum
powers reserved to the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly, consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.
(2)(a) The people reserve to themselves the initiative power, which is to propose
laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election
independently of the Legislative Assembly.
(b) An initiative law may be proposed only by a petition signed by a number of
qualified voters equal to six percent of the total number of votes cast for all
candidates for Governor  [*855]  at the election at which a Governor was elected for
a term of four years next preceding the filing of the petition.
(c) An initiative amendment to the Constitution may be proposed only by a petition
signed by a number of qualified voters equal to eight percent of the total number of
votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the election at which a Governor was
elected for a term of four years next preceding the filing of the petition. n255
The Lloyd Corporation argued that the constitution said nothing about creating a right to gather
initiative petition signatures on private property. n256 The defendants argued that, nevertheless,
without an opportunity to gather signatures where voters are likely to congregate - in places such as
shopping centers - the initiative and referendum process that article IV, section 1, provides would be
compromised. n257 The Lloyd Corporation countered that to do that would amount to compelling it
to relinquish possession of its private property without compensation in violation of article I, section
18, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment. n258
It should be remembered that Whiffen was decided after Priest. In responding to the parties'
arguments, therefore, the court - in theory, at least - should have looked first to the text to determine
whether article IV, section 1, says anything about creating a right to gather initiative petition
signatures at any particular location. Of course, article IV, section 1, says nothing of the sort. It only
reserves the right of the initiative and requires that a certain number of signatures be gathered to
qualify an initiative measure for an election. The court also should have looked to the enactment
history of the provision. Had the court done so, it would have found no support for the notion that
the framers intended to create a right that would require private property owners to give up the right
to exclude members of the public who wish to solicit initiative petition signatures. The fact of the
matter is that such a notion had never occurred to anyone at the turn of the century. It was not until
the 1940s that it was first suggested  [*856]  that private property owners might not have the
unfettered right to exclude members of the public from using their premises for purposes of political
expression. n259 Thus, as with Robertson, following the traditional originalist approach of Priest
should have led the court to a relatively straightforward answer.
But, once again, that is not what the court did. The court began by noting Oregon's "long-
established tradition of respect for the initiative process." n260 Then, citing a dissenting opinion
from a Michigan Supreme Court case, the court commented that "'access to people is the life blood
of the initiative power.'" n261 It is therefore "'implicit in article IV, section 1,'" the court concluded,
"'that the people must have adequate opportunities to sign the petitions that are necessary for them
to act as legislators.'" n262 The court also observed that the process of gathering the necessary
number of signatures is substantially impaired - indeed, almost doubled in time, by the evidence in
at least one prior case - if conducted in public parks and on sidewalks, as opposed to shopping
malls. n263 Impairing the initiative process, "'one of our society's most precious rights,'" is simply
unacceptable, the court commented. n264 "Thus," it concluded, "where the process of gathering
signatures can occur is of vital importance in making effective the purposes of article IV, section 1."
n265 To "make effective the purposes of article IV, section 1," the court announced a right of the
public to solicit initiative petition signatures in the "common areas" of shopping centers, subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. n266
 [*857]  Interestingly, the court did not define what it meant by "common areas" or, for that
matter, "shopping centers." The court did refer to a portion of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Marsh v. Alabama, n267 in which the Court held that "the more an owner [of private
property], for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." n268
Marsh was the "company town" case in which a Jehovah's Witness was arrested for handing out
religious literature on the sidewalk of a town that was owned completely by a ship-building
company. It is not at all clear what the Oregon court meant in quoting from Marsh, whether the
focus of the court's reasoning was the factual context of the case, the functional equivalency of a
company-owned town and an ordinary American municipality, or the scope of the property owner's
invitation to the public to treat private property as public property. Moreover, the court left entirely
unexplained precisely why anything the United States Supreme Court had to say in a First
Amendment case had any relevance to an Oregon case not decided under the Oregon free-
expression clause.
As for the Lloyd Corporation's takings argument, the court first noted that neither party had
suggested that the takings clauses of the state and federal constitutions should be interpreted
differently. n269 "Therefore," the court decided, "we assume, without deciding, that the analysis
would be the same under both constitutions." n270 This was an odd thing for an Oregon court to say
years after the supposedly successful Oregon constitutional revolution. Recall that in Clark, no party
had argued that article I, section 20, should be interpreted differently from the Fourteenth
Amendment; indeed, the defendant in that case had disclaimed any interest in relying on the state
constitution. The court nevertheless declared its obligation to examine the state constitution
independent of the Federal Constitution in that case. n271 Why the same obligation did not apply in
Whiffen the court did not explain. In any event, relying on federal cases construing the Fifth
Amendment in similar circumstances, the court quickly concluded that requiring private property
owners  [*858]  to permit citizens to exercise state-permitted rights of free expression did not
constitute a taking of property under the Federal Constitution. n272
The opinion drew a vigorous dissent from Justice W. Michael Gillette and two other members
of the court. n273 Gillette took the majority to task for failing to pay adequate attention to the text
of article IV, section 1, and its enactment history: "The majority cites nothing in the history of or the
case law concerning article IV, section 1, to justify its conclusion. Indeed, it does not even deign to
discuss those topics." n274 The majority offered nothing in reply to justify its departure from the
originalist interpretive methodology that ordinarily applies to the construction of the Oregon
Constitution.
Whiffen was bound to cause no end of mischief. Its interpretative foundation was so evanescent
that it could not provide any principled guidance for later courts attempting to flesh out the scope of
the right that the court discovered "implicit" in article IV, section 1. And mischief is exactly what
happened.
In State v. Cargill, n275 for example, the court of appeals decided that the public had a right to
solicit initiative petition signatures at a local Fred Meyer department store. Decided before Whiffen,
the court based its decision on its conclusion that the store contained public areas that were "a
modern replacement for the town square or park." n276 Fred Meyer petitioned for review by the
Oregon Supreme Court, and the court accepted. After three years, however, the court could not
reach a decision on the case. Even after the publication of the Whiffen decision, the court ultimately
was forced to give up, and the case was affirmed without opinion by an equally divided court. n277
The court had another occasion to confront the issue in State v. Dameron. n278 In that case, the
defendant had been convicted of criminal trespass for soliciting initiative petition signatures on a
sidewalk outside the entrance to another Fred Meyer department store. The defendant had argued
that he had a constitutional  [*859]  right to be on the premises, but the trial court disagreed. The
supreme court reversed, but in the process generated six different opinions.
The lead opinion, by Justice George Van Hoomisen, held that the state had failed to prove that
the Fred Meyer store involved was not like the shopping center in Whiffen to which the public's
rights under article IV, section 1, attached. n279 Van Hoomisen emphasized that his was a decision
based on non-constitutional grounds. n280
Justice Richard Unis, in contrast, concurred in the result, but wrote that he would have decided
the case on the constitutional ground asserted by the defendant. According to Unis, there was
sufficient evidence in the record to determine that the Fred Meyer store in that case was like the
shopping center at issue in Whiffen, although his opinion did not describe precisely what it was
about the Fred Meyer store in Dameron that made it "like" the shopping center in Whiffen. n281
Justice Thomas Tongue agreed with Unis that there was sufficient evidence to determine the
constitutionally significant characteristics of the Fred Meyer store at issue. n282 To supply the
criteria for making that decision, Tongue advocated adoption of a three-part test articulated in a
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court. n283 That test involved balancing (1) the nature and the
"primary use" of the property; (2) the nature and extent of the public's invitation to use the private
property; and (3) the purpose of the expressive activity to be conducted on private property. n284
Tongue also suggested that the guarantee of free expression in article I, section 8, provided an
independent basis for the defendant's assertion of a constitutional right to solicit initiative  [*860]
petition signatures on private property. n285 Interestingly, in arriving at that conclusion, Tongue
avoided the interpretive methodology required by Robertson by simply declaring that Robertson
involved the issues of vagueness and over-breadth and therefore was distinguishable. n286 Instead,
Tongue advocated a theory of free expression adopted by the California and New Jersey Supreme
Courts in similar cases. n287
Justice Fadeley concurred in both Van Hoomisen's lead opinion and in Unis's concurrence,
although it is not entirely clear how that was possible. n288
Justice Gillette, in a dissent, reiterated that there simply was no right to solicit initiative petition
signatures, explicit or implicit, in article IV, section 1. n289 Justice Edwin Peterson joined in that
dissent, but also joined in the lead opinion, reasoning that, because of the court's decision in
Whiffen, the state was obliged to prove that the Fred Meyer store at issue was different from the
shopping center in Whiffen. n290
The court of appeals fared no better in attempting to divine the nature and scope of the right
created in Whiffen. For example, in Safeway, Inc. v. Jane Does 1 through 50, n291 Safeway asked
for a declaration as to whether all of its ninety-one stores in Oregon are subject to the public's right
to solicit initiative petition signatures in the common areas of "shopping centers." The court of
appeals declined to answer the question as a matter of law and, instead, developed a list of
evidentiary factors by which it could be determined whether a given commercial establishment is of
the type that is subject to the right created in Whiffen:
In cases in which we and the Supreme Court have held that such a right exists, we
have considered non-exclusive factors such as the size and configuration of the
premises, its relationship to other businesses in the area, whether the premises are
bordered by public or private properties, whether the premises are intersected by
public streets and sidewalks, whether the premises and adjoining multiple privately
owned businesses  [*861]  open directly onto public areas, and whether there are
public transportation stops adjacent to the premises. Also pertinent to the inquiry are
the scope of business endeavors that are included in the surrounding area and
conducted on the premises, the characteristics of the invitation to the public by the
businesses in the area, the availability of areas for the public to congregate for
noncommercial purposes, the number of people who frequent the premises and the
purposes for which the premises and common areas are used. n292
Then in Wabban v. Brookhart, n293 the court took a slightly different approach. The court held
that two HomeBase retail outlets were not subject to the public's right to collect initiative petition
signatures on private property. In so doing, it characterized the inquiry in the following terms: "The
question before us is whether these premises, by reason of HomeBase's express or implied invitation
to the public, are a forum for assembly by the community." n294
But in Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, n295 the court took still another approach. In that case, Fred
Meyer had arrested a citizen for refusing to leave the sidewalk outside the store where she had been
gathering initiative petition signatures. She brought an action for false arrest against the store. This
time it was the store that asserted a constitutional right, the right to exclude members of the public
from private property. The trial court permitted the jury to decide the case, and it returned a verdict
for the individual. n296 A majority of the court, sitting en banc, upheld the verdict. In the lead
opinion authored by Judge - now Justice - William Riggs, four members of the court held that there
was sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the Fred Meyer store in that case was "like" the
shopping center at issue in Whiffen and the Fred Meyer store in Cargill. n297 For the four members
in the lead opinion, "like" meant that the store had similar square footage, similar weekly gross
receipts, similar physical layout, and that it leased out at least some space to tenant businesses. n298
Why those particular physical characteristics had  [*862]  constitutional significance, the lead
opinion did not explain. Judge - now Justice - Susan Leeson concurred. According to Leeson, the
lead opinion missed the constitutional point, which was that, by operating a commercial enterprise
that invited members of the public to enter and spend money, Fred Meyer had lost any right to
exclude members of the public except by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. n299 Four
other members of the court dissented, arguing that the only test that made constitutional sense was
one that permitted solicitation of initiative petition signatures on private property only to the extent
that the owner of the property invited the public to treat the property as public space. n300
What is most interesting for my purposes is the wide array of interpretive approaches that have
been brought to bear from Whiffen to Stranahan. In Whiffen itself, the court relied on rights that are
"implicit" in the language of the state constitution,  [*863]  but also resorted to federal constitutional
case law and to the law - or rather to a dissenting opinion - from another state court. The dissenting
justices relied on the text of the Oregon Constitution and its intended meaning as revealed in
relevant historical sources. In subsequent cases, the Oregon courts resorted to federal law, to the law
of California and New Jersey, or to no law at all.
Eventually - perhaps inevitably - the Supreme Court abandoned Whiffen altogether. In 1999, the
court accepted review of the court of appeals' decision in Stranahan and took the opportunity to
reexamine article IV, section 1, from scratch. n301 This time, the court returned to its originalist
interpretive tradition to determine whether those who adopted the disputed provision intended
implicitly to create a constitutional right to collect initiative petition signatures on private property.
n302 Interestingly, the court did not invoke Priest in the process. Priest, the court said, applied only
to provisions of the Oregon Constitution that were adopted in 1857. n303 Instead, the court applied
what it characterized as a "slightly different" methodology tailored to constitutional provisions
enacted by the initiative process. n304 More about that later. n305 For present purposes, it suffices
to observe that the court concluded that "after considering the text, the relevant case law, and the
history of the initiative and referendum provisions of article IV, section 1, we have found nothing to
support the conclusion set out in Whiffen," that is, that there is a constitutional right to solicit
initiative petition signatures on private property over the objections of the property owner. n306
Thus, the court's indulgence in constitutional interpretation by implication came to a definitive end.
Whether Stranahan signals a more consistent approach to constitutional interpretation, however,
remains an open question. n307
 [*864]   
4. Deja vu All Over Again: Interpretation by Reference to Federal Law
Of course, the linchpin of the state constitutional revolution has been the notion that state
constitutions have force and effect independent of the Federal Constitution and therefore are entitled
to independent interpretation. As I have noted, that does not necessarily mean that state
constitutions always will be interpreted before parallel federal constitutional provisions. Some state
courts will inquire as to the meaning of their state constitution only when it has first been
determined that the Federal Constitution has not been offended. In Oregon, however, the courts
have planted themselves firmly in a different camp. They have adopted the "first things first"
approach to constitutional interpretation; that is to say, the Oregon courts always will determine the
meaning of the Oregon Constitution before delving into the meaning of a federal constitutional
counterpart.
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Clark is but one of many examples. Recall in that case
that the defendant had disclaimed reliance on the privileges and immunity provision of the Oregon
Constitution and relied instead on the Fourteenth Amendment. That did not stop the court from
expounding on the meaning of article I, section 20, of the state constitution. The court proclaimed
an obligation to do so. n308
The court's decision in State v. Kennedy n309 provides another illustration of the point. In that
case, the defendant raised a double jeopardy challenge to his criminal convictions, citing both the
state and federal constitutional double jeopardy clauses. n310 The Attorney General suggested that
the court should decline to address the applicability of the state double jeopardy clause, because the
defendant had failed to suggest any distinct analysis  [*865]  under the state constitution. n311 The
court rejected the Attorney General's suggestion. According to the court, "an Oregon court should
not readily let parties, simply by their choice of issues, force the court into a position to decide that
the state's government has fallen below a nationwide constitutional standard," when the matter may
be disposed by application of state law. n312
At least that is how it works in theory. In practice, the Oregon courts have turned out to be less
than completely faithful to the "first things first" doctrine. In a substantial number of cases - long
after the state constitutional revolution was declared won - they have continued to resort to federal
constitutional law before determining independently the meaning of a parallel state constitutional
provision. n313 There are, in fact, at least three different ways in which federal law continues to
influence the interpretation of the Oregon Constitution.
a. Federal Law as Persuasive "Authority"
First, in a number of cases, the Oregon courts will resort to federal constitutional case law for its
"persuasive" force. On the surface, at least, this seems innocuous enough. The courts are not relying
on federal law because they feel bound to do so, but rather because they choose to do so.
In Billings v. Gates, n314 for example, the court addressed the proper constitutional standard to
determine whether the denial of medical treatment to an inmate amounts to "cruel and unusual
punishment" in violation of article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Specifically, the issue
was whether merely negligent denial of medical treatment could amount to a violation of article I,
section 16. n315 After citing the originalist methodology of Priest, the court examined the text of
the provision, noting that the language "cruel and unusual punishments shall not be  [*866]
inflicted" suggested that only the prohibition of intentional acts were prohibited. n316 The court
then proceeded to the enactment history and the prior Oregon case law construing article I, section
16. n317 Unfortunately, the court found little insight in the usual historical sources, the
constitutional convention having passed the clause without any recorded discussion. n318 The court
also noted that the prior case law proved less than helpful because the decisions customarily
resorted to federal law without first engaging in a separate state constitutional analysis. n319
At that point, the court turned to federal law for help. It began by noting that federal court
decisions may prove helpful, "'particularly when they provide insight into the origins of provisions
common to the state and federal bills of rights,'" which seems perfectly consistent with the
originalist orientation of Priest. n320 But then having said that, the court turned to a 1976 United
States Supreme Court decision in which the Court determined that the denial of medical treatment
to inmates amounted to cruel and unusual punishment only when there is "'deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners.'" n321 Only such a deliberate indifference standard, the Court
held, could offend the "evolving standards of decency" reading of the Eighth Amendment. n322 The
Oregon Supreme Court then simply declared that it found the United States Supreme Court's
decision "persuasive" and adopted it as the standard under article I, section 16. n323
This strikes me as rather odd. If the objective of Oregon constitutional interpretation is to
ascertain the intentions of the framers in 1857, as the court said it is in Priest, how is it that a 1976
federal decision about the Federal Constitution sheds light on those intentions? Certainly it is
conceivable that a twentieth-  [*867]  century federal court decision that explains the historical
underpinnings of a common constitutional provision could prove helpful in understanding the
intended meaning of a state constitutional provision. But the Oregon court in Billings drew no such
historical insights from the federal case law. The court merely noted that the United States Supreme
Court had concluded that the "deliberate indifference" standard was necessary to comply with the
Eighth Amendment and that it found the opinion "persuasive." Later in the opinion, the court noted
that the "deliberate indifference" standard is the only one that is consistent with the text of article I,
section 16, which - as the court earlier had noted - suggested that only intentional conduct triggered
the protection of the state constitution. n324 If that is so, then what did the federal case law add to
the analysis? The federal case clearly either was irrelevant or was window dressing.
The court similarly found federal constitutional law "persuasive" in State v. Brown, n325 in
which it first addressed the question of whether to adopt an "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement of article I, section 9, the search and seizure provision of the Oregon Constitution. n326
In a brief opinion, the court declared there is such an exception, provided that the automobile is
mobile at the time it is stopped by the authorities and that probable cause exists for the search of the
vehicle. n327 Before declaring that to be the law, the court did not examine the language of article I,
section 9 - which, of course, says nothing about an automobile exception. Nor did the court examine
the historical record to determine whether the framers would have intended that the court have the
authority to fashion such exceptions. The court cited two United States Supreme Court decisions
applying the Fourth Amendment, n328 quoted briefly from them, and concluded  [*868]  that it
found them "persuasive." n329 The court emphatically denied that it was deciding the case on
federal constitutional grounds. "We wish to make clear," the court stated, "that we are deciding this
case independent of federal law; we decide this case under the Oregon Constitution and not the
Federal Constitution. We cite the United States Supreme Court decisions only because we believe
they are persuasive." n330
Once again, however, the court failed to explain precisely what it was about the two Supreme
Court cases that it found persuasive. Justice Linde, in fact, authored a strongly worded dissent that,
among other things, called the majority on its failure to engage in any meaningful independent
Oregon constitutional analysis: "It may be tempting to adopt another court's reasoning by reference
rather than to spell out one's own, but in areas such as search and seizure law, quotations only beg
the question why the quoted opinion is more persuasive than other opinions or academic critiques
that are not quoted." n331 The majority declined to respond to Linde's complaint.
b.  "Assuming" the Identity of State and Federal Law
In a second category of cases, the Oregon courts decline to address first the meaning of a state
constitutional provision and instead assume, without deciding, that parallel state and federal
constitutional provisions have identical meaning and then decide the case accordingly. This practice
already has revealed itself in the Whiffen decision, in which the court addressed the argument that
requiring a land owner to permit the public to solicit initiative signatures on its private property
amounted to an uncompensated taking of property under both the state and federal constitutions.
n332 The court in that case simply noted that, because no one had suggested that article I, section
18, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be
interpreted differently, it would assume that they have the same meaning. n333 Whiffen turns out
not to be an aberration. Indeed, the Oregon courts have shown a singular  [*869]  reluctance to
tackle the independent significance of the state takings clause.
Early on, of course, the Oregon courts determined that the state and federal takings clauses "are
identical in language and meaning." n334 Some twenty years later, in Fifth Avenue Corp. v.
Washington County, n335 the Oregon Supreme Court reflected that same assumption. In Fifth
Avenue Corp., the court held that an owner is entitled to compensation for inverse condemnation
based on designating land as "greenway" property only if the owner can show that he or she is
"precluded from all economically feasible private uses" pending the ultimate purchase for the
greenway or if the owner can show that the designation caused "virtually irreversible damage."
n336 In arriving at that conclusion, the court did not examine the language of article I, section 18,
much less any historical materials to ascertain the intended meaning of the provision. Instead, the
court cited New York case law that construed the Fifth Amendment. n337
Several years later, however, in Suess Builders Co. v. Beaverton, n338 the court backed off
from its categorical statement that the federal and state takings clauses are identical and held that
"although the basic thrust of the Fifth Amendment and art[icle] I, [section] 18, is generally the same
... the criteria of compensable 'taking for public use' under art[icle] I, [section] 18, are not
necessarily identical." n339 The court seemed poised to embark on an independent investigation of
the intended meaning of the state takings clause. But the court never followed through. Since Suess
Builders Co., the court has not once attempted to discern the meaning of article I, section 18,
certainly not by applying the interpretive methodology of Priest. Instead, the court has been content
merely to assume, without deciding, that the state and federal takings clauses have the same
meaning.
For example, in Department of Transportation v. Lundberg, n340 landowners challenged the
constitutionality of a local sidewalk  [*870]  dedication ordinance on the basis of both the state and
federal takings clauses. The court held: "Defendants, however, do not suggest any different analysis
under the Oregon Constitution than under the United States Constitution. Therefore, we assume for
purposes of this case, without deciding, that the analysis would be the same under the Oregon
Constitution." n341
Similarly, in Stevens v. Cannon Beach, n342 the owners of beachfront property challenged the
constitutionality of a state law that prohibited building on the dry sand areas of the beach. They
relied on both the state and federal takings clauses. But the court held that "because plaintiffs have
not made a separate argument under the state constitution, we will assume for the purposes of this
case, without deciding, that the analysis would be the same under the Oregon Constitution." n343
To the same effect is GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission. n344 In that case, GTE
challenged the constitutionality of a rule that required it to make space available in its facilities for
competitors. Although GTE alleged a taking of property under both state and federal takings
clauses, the court held that, because "GTE offers no separate analysis under the state constitution....
we assume, without deciding, that the analysis is the same under article I, section 18, of the Oregon
Constitution, and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment." n345
This practice of assuming that parallel state and federal constitutional provisions have identical
meanings, frankly, is difficult to understand. The court has gone to great lengths to reassert the
importance of its "first things first" approach to state constitutionalism. Even when the parties have
not articulated a separate analysis under the state constitution, as in Kennedy, the court has
proclaimed its commitment to identifying the meaning of a relevant state constitutional provision
before turning to the Federal Constitution. Indeed, even when the parties have disclaimed an interest
in the state constitution, as in Clark, the court nevertheless has professed an obligation to apply the
state constitution before resorting to federal constitutional analysis. But for some reason, the "first
things first" approach does not apply to the takings  [*871]  clause. n346
c. Old-fashioned "Lockstep" Analysis
In some cases, the Oregon courts do not adopt federal constitutional analysis because, after
consideration of its merits, the courts find it persuasive. Nor do the courts merely assume, for the
sake of argument, that federal law controls. The courts simply adopt federal law as state law without
further explanation. This is especially surprising, given the state's longstanding commitment to state
constitutionalism. But the fact remains that, in some cases, the courts simply have declined to do
anything other than continue to rely on federal law.
State v. Mai n347 is perhaps the most obvious example. At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of a law that permits a trial judge to prohibit a criminal defendant from calling a
witness to the stand because the defendant failed to disclose the identity of the witness before trial.
The defendant argued that the law conflicted with his right to compulsory process, as guaranteed in
article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. After quoting the state and federal constitutional provisions, the court declared that
"we construe the state compulsory process clause in the same way as the Supreme Court construed
the virtually identical federal counterpart in Washington v. Texas." n348 There was no pretense of
declaring that the federal court was merely "persuasive." The court simply declared that the state
and federal clauses were effectively interchangeable. In the years since the Mai decision, the court
has returned to article I, section 11, but not once has it questioned the reliance on federal
constitutional case law to ascertain  [*872]  the meaning of the state constitutional provision. n349
State v. Rogers n350 is another good example. In that case, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the state's death penalty law on the ground that the penalty amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of both state and federal constitutions. The court responded to
the argument by declaring that "the standard for determining whether punishment is cruel and
unusual is whether 'the punishment [is] so proportioned to the offense committed as to shock the
moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.'" n351
There is no further analysis, no examination of the text of the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, no resort to historical materials to determine
what the framers intended the clause to mean. Instead, the court merely quoted a 1921 case, Sustar
v. County Court. n352 In Sustar, likewise, the court engaged in no independent analysis of the
Oregon Constitution. The court merely announced its standard and cited a United States Supreme
Court decision rendered under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, Weems v. United States. n353
A similar reasoning process is reflected in State v. Bridewell, n354 in which the Oregon
Supreme Court applied an "emergency doctrine" exception to the warrant requirement of article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. In arriving at its decision, the court simply noted that "this
court has recognized the existence of an 'emergency doctrine' exception to the warrant requirement
in the context of investigation of crime" n355 and cited an earlier case, State v. Miller. n356 The
problem is that, in Miller, the Oregon Supreme Court's discussion of the justification for adopting
an "emergency doctrine" exception consisted of a description of federal law, followed by a citation
to a United States Supreme Court decision. n357 There is no mention in Miller of article I, section
[*873]  9, at all. Thus, the court effectively treated the state and federal constitutional search and
seizure provisions as fungible, a practice that the court supposedly had disavowed completely years
earlier.
5. Constitutional Interpretation as Statutory Construction: The Interpretation of Constitutional
Provisions Enacted by Initiative
Oregon is one of two dozen states in which the citizens have "retained" the right to enact
legislation, including amendments to the state constitution, by direct democracy. n358 Once enacted
by a vote of the people, constitutional amendments produced by the initiative process become part
of the state constitution and are no less authoritative than are the original provisions enacted in 1857
or constitutional amendments that originated in the Legislative Assembly. n359
Because constitutional provisions that originated in the 1857 convention and those enacted by
initiative have equal effect, it would stand to reason that the courts would subject them to the same
interpretive rules. Nevertheless, under Oregon law, provisions  [*874]  of the Oregon Constitution
that were enacted through the initiative process are subject to a different interpretive process than
are other constitutional provisions.
The leading case for this rule is Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon v. Oregon State Lottery
Commission. n360 In that case, the plaintiffs - a group of citizens and civic organizations opposed
to state-sponsored gambling - challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that permitted the
Oregon State Lottery Commission to license video poker gaming devices in restaurants and bars.
n361 The plaintiffs relied on article XV, section 4(7), which provides that "the Legislative
Assembly has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos from operation in the State of
Oregon." n362 The provision had been enacted by initiative some ten years earlier as part of a larger
series of amendments that created a State Lottery Commission to operate a state lottery. The precise
issue before the court was whether the authorization of video poker in restaurants and bars
amounted to the authorization of the operation of "casinos" in the state.
In addressing that issue, the court began by describing what it characterized as "an orderly
method of analyzing ambiguous terms in constitutional provisions adopted through the initiative
process." n363 That process, the court held, was the same one that it had developed for the
interpretation of statutes, which consists of a three-step analysis:
This court applies to the construction of a statute the same method of analysis ...
that it applies to the construction of an initiated constitutional provision. That is, the
first level of analysis is to examine text and context. That level includes subsidiary
principles of statutory construction that are relevant to this case. In determining the
meaning of the text of a statute, words of common usage that are not defined in the
statute typically are to be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. And, the
context of a statutory provision includes other provisions of the same statute and
other statutes on the same subject. Only if the legislative intent remains unclear after
an examination of text and context does the court consider legislative history. n364
 [*875]   
The court cited its seminal decision on the construction of statutes, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, n365 which it had decided the previous year.
It is important to understand what was entailed in adopting the PGE methodology for the
interpretation of constitutional amendments enacted by initiative. The principal feature of the PGE
methodology is its rigidly sequential nature. It is, in essence, a reformulation of the turn-of-the-
century "plain meaning rule." n366 The objective of the interpretive endeavor is ascertaining the
intentions of the legislature. n367 But those intentions are derived by following a three-step process.
The first step involves examining the text in its context, along with appropriate rules of textual
construction. n368 The focus at the first step of the analysis is to determine whether the disputed
provision is "ambiguous," which the court defines as reasonably capable of more than one
construction. If the language is unambiguous, the interpretive exercise is at an end. n369 The court
cannot examine other extrinsic evidence of the intentions of the legislature, such as legislative
history. Only if the disputed language is ambiguous can the court proceed to the second and third
steps, examining legislative history and, if necessary, substantive canons of construction. n370
That it is impermissible to examine legislative history in the absence of a patent ambiguity
reflects a more textualist approach to statutory construction than the court's appeals to the
"intentions of the legislature" otherwise would seem to imply. And that textualist approach finds
expression in the manner in which the court has applied PGE in particular cases. The fact is, since
the court announced its intention to adhere to the three-step methodology, the court has resorted to
legislative history in a relatively  [*876]  small percentage of cases. n371 In that light, it is
interesting to see how the court applied its PGE methodology to the construction of the state
constitution.
Turning back to Ecumenical Ministries, in applying the methods of statutory construction to
article XV, section 4(7), the court first ascertained the common, ordinary meaning of the
constitutional term "casino" by reference to a dictionary. n372 The court concluded that, in common
usage, a "casino" is a physical structure for gambling. n373 The court also consulted portions of the
lottery amendments, which referred to prohibiting the use of terminals or devices that directly
dispensed money to players and which also referred to prohibiting lottery retailers from engaging
exclusively in the business of selling lottery tickets. n374 In combination, the court concluded,
those provisions suggested that, in enacting the "casino" prohibition of article XV, section 4(7), the
people most likely intended to prevent the establishment of enterprises "engaged exclusively" in
lottery-related activities, not to prevent a restaurant or a bar from operating a video poker game.
n375
The court's opinion drew two separate concurring opinions from Justice Fadeley and from
Justice Unis, both of whom objected to the new methodology that the majority employed. In both
cases, the concurring justices objected to the failure of the court to examine the "legislative history"
of article XV, section 4(7). Fadeley complained:
The intent of the voters who adopted the constitutional amendment must control
our interpretation and application of it. It is the touchstone for any interpretation of
an initiated measure. The best evidence of that intent, in an initiated amendment, is
found in the material that all voters had before them when they voted, namely, the
caption and question portions of the ballot title, which are printed directly on all
ballots used by all absentee and regular voters to cast their votes. In determining the
voters' intent, I cannot join the lead opinion  [*877]  in relegating to a secondary
status the one thing that all voters are most likely to read before voting to amend the
constitution. n376
Unis similarly complained:
I am not willing ... to join that part of the opinion that suggests that this court should
put on analytical "blinders" so as to avoid considering relevant information as to
what the voters intended in enacting an initiated constitutional provision. In
interpreting an initiated constitutional provision, this court should consider available
sources of information that bear on the interpretation of the provision. For example,
even if the text and context seem unambiguous, I believe that this court should
examine sources of information that were available to the voters that may disclose
the voters' understanding and intent in enacting an initiated constitutional provision.
n377
 The majority did not respond to either Fadeley's or Unis's complaints.
The court's adoption of a special methodology for the construction of provisions of the
constitution enacted by initiative raises several interesting questions. To begin with, is the
Ecumenical Ministries/PGE methodology different from the approach used for the interpretation of
other constitutional provisions? For if not, then what is the point of describing the interpretive
process in such special terms?
It seems clear to me that the Ecumenical Ministries/PGE approach to interpreting constitutional
provisions enacted by initiative is, indeed, different from any of the interpretive approaches that I
have described thus far. In particular, it departs from the traditional methodology of Priest in its
refusal to examine historical materials in the absence of an ambiguity in the constitutional text. No
such condition ever has been employed in interpreting portions of the Oregon Constitution that were
enacted either by referendum or as part of the original constitution in 1857.
In Lipscomb v. Board of Higher Education, n378 for example, the court addressed the meaning
of article V, section 15a, enacted by the people after referral from the legislature in 1921. That
provision authorizes the governor to veto "any provision in new bills declaring an emergency."
n379 On the surface, at least, the provision seems unambiguously to authorize the governor to veto
[*878]  "any provision" in a bill that contains an emergency clause. The court did not stop at the
text, however. Indeed, openly disdainful of any rule that prohibited examination of historical
materials in the quest for the voters' intent, n380 the court consulted a wide range of materials,
including the ballot title, materials in the Voters' Pamphlet, and news media articles that might have
influenced voter thinking at the time. n381 On the basis of that historical inquiry, the court
concluded that, whatever might be suggested by a surface reading of the text, the voters really
intended to authorize the governor to veto only an emergency clause itself, to combat the tendency
of legislators to insert emergency clauses to thwart the possibility of referral to the voters. n382
That leads to the even more interesting question of why the court feels it necessary to employ
such a different methodology for the interpretation of constitutional provisions enacted by initiative.
The answer is not immediately obvious, given that constitutional  [*879]  provisions enacted by
initiative are no less "constitutional," that is, they have no different legal effect than provisions
enacted after referral by the legislature or adoption by the people in 1857. The court did not address
that issue in Ecumenical Ministries.
It did recently touch on the subject in Stranahan, however. Recall that, in that decision, the court
abandoned its line of cases beginning with Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, n383 which recognized an
implied right to collect initiative petition signatures on private property. In doing so, the court first
observed that adherence to original intent long has been the touchstone of Oregon constitutional
interpretation. n384 The ascertainment of original intent, the court noted, generally is accomplished
by reference to a provision's text, its enactment history, and the previous cases construing it, as
provided in Priest. n385 But the court held that, in the case of provisions enacted by initiative, Priest
does not apply, and instead, Ecumenical Ministries does. n386 Why? Here is what the court offered
by way of explanation:
We make that distinction because of the inherent difference between original
constitutional provisions and those later adopted or amended by legislative referral or
initiative petition. As to the former, the drafters of the constitution crafted those
provisions and submitted them to the people for approval without the benefit of an
existing constitutional framework. In contrast, provisions or amendments created
through either legislative referral or initiative petition are adopted by the people
against the backdrop of an existing constitutional framework. It follows that, with
respect to the latter provisions, it is the people's understanding and intended meaning
of the provision in question - as to which the text and context are the most important
clue - that are critical to our analysis. n387
 Interestingly, that explanation is followed immediately by a footnote, which cautions: "We
continue to emphasize that, in either case, our focus must be on the intent of the enactors of the
provision at issue." n388
Thus, it is clear that the court perceives an "inherent difference" between original provisions and
those later enacted by initiative.  [*880]  That difference is that the former provisions are enacted
"without the benefit of an existing constitutional framework," while the latter provisions are enacted
against the backdrop of such an existing framework. Why that difference justifies distinct
interpretive approaches, however, the court never explains. Instead, it simply asserts, ipse dixit, that
"it follows." The problem is that it does not necessarily follow. Merely because one provision was
enacted against a constitutional backdrop does not explain why it is subject to a different
interpretive approach - and potentially a different interpretation - than identical language that was
enacted without such a backdrop.
The court's closely following footnote does not help matters. If anything it muddies the waters
even more. The court declares that, under Priest and Ecumenical Ministries, the interpretive
objective remains the same: "the intent of the enactors of the provision at issue." The court appears
to be suggesting that there is no real difference between the interpretive regimes of Priest and
Ecumenical Ministries. But, if that is so, what is the point of insisting, as the court clearly does in
Stranahan, that each applies only in specified cases? Either there is a difference between the
interpretive approaches, or there is not. If there is, then there should be an explanation that justifies
it. If there is not, then the court should not persist in drawing the distinction.
That is not to say that there are no possible justifications for the application of different
interpretive methodologies in the case of constitutional provisions enacted by different means.
Some have argued that, because of certain perceived defects in the initiative process - in particular,
the avoidance of the deliberative checks that ordinarily are a product of the legislative process -
judicial review of constitutional and statutory provisions enacted by initiative should be different
than review of enactments that are products of the usual processes. Philip Frickey, for example,
suggests that, for similar reasons, in the interpretation of initiated measures, courts should be less
deferential and apply interpretive rules that are more demanding of the text. n389  [*881]  Jane
Schacter, in a much-quoted study, has suggested that measures that are products of the initiative
power warrant more demanding interpretive rules because they are so poorly drafted and because
social science research demonstrates that voters do not exercise their initiative powers in an
informed way. n390
But, even assuming the validity of those critiques of the initiative process, it does not appear
that the particular "plain meaning" approach of Ecumenical Ministries is responsive to them. If
anything, the Oregon courts' approach runs counter to the criticism. If, for example, initiative
measures are subject to suspicion because they are so often poorly drafted, why would the courts
require the application of a textualist interpretive approach that more often than not ignores
extrinsic evidence of voter intent?
That the Ecumenical Ministries methodology explicitly expropriates the court's methodology for
the construction of statutes suggests that the court may be thinking that initiated constitutional
amendments tend to be more detailed and statutory in nature and thus are entitled to the different
interpretive approach. Recall that some courts, such as New Jersey and North Carolina, draw
distinctions between portions of their state constitutions that can be regarded as "great ordinances"
and other portions  [*882]  that are more narrow and "statutory" in nature and then employ different
interpretive approaches to the different types of constitutional provisions. n391 The problem is that
there is no necessary parallel between the substance of a constitutional provision and the manner in
which it was enacted. Some provisions of the Oregon Constitution that were enacted by initiative
consist of very vague, high sounding, declarations of principle. The initiative provisions of article
IV, section 1, qualify. n392 So also might the broadly worded guarantees of a recently enacted
crime victims' bill of rights. n393 By the same token, there are some very detailed "statutory"
provisions in the Oregon Constitution that either date back to the original 1857 version or were
enacted after referral by the legislature, such as article IV, section 6, dealing with reapportionment,
n394 or article VI, section 10, concerning county home rule, n395 or article VIII, section 2,
regarding the common school fund. n396
Examination of the prior case law offers no clues either. The fact is, before Ecumenical
Ministries, sometimes the court interpreted initiated constitutional provisions by applying
interpretive rules drawn from statutory construction, and sometimes it did not. n397 More
specifically, sometimes the court declined to examine the enactment history of a constitutional
provision because its meaning was clear from the text, and sometimes it  [*883]  pursued the
historical record regardless of the absence of an apparent ambiguity. There is, thus, no good
explanation for the court's interpretive choice. The court simply made it, and it shows no sign of
reconsidering the matter.
6. A Question of Balance: Constitutional Interpretation by Balancing
A bedrock principle of Oregon constitutionalism has been that the state constitution cannot be
interpreted by ad hoc balancing of one interest against another. This stands in stark contrast to the
"Two-Tiered Scrutinies, Three-Pronged Tests, Four-Factored Analyses, Sensitive Balances and
sundry exotica currently occupying the United States Supreme Court's menagerie" n398 of
constitutional jurisprudence. The resistance to balancing is rooted in the writings of Linde and a
respect for the constitutional text. Recall, for example, his Clear and Present Danger article, which
criticized federal free expression cases for failing to accept the fact that the First Amendment
contains an unqualified prohibition, not a conditional suggestion that requires a weighing of
competing individual and government interests. n399
The same criticism found its way into numerous Oregon constitutional cases as the court
repeatedly rejected calls for adoption of one balancing test or another. In Libertarian Party of
Oregon v. Roberts, n400 the court offered perhaps its most complete statement of its general
approach to constitutional interpretation:
The difficulty with this balance-of-interests argument is that it assumes that a
court can and should attach values to the conflicting interests asserted, aggregate the
resulting values and then compare the aggregates to arrive at a decision concerning
the constitutionality of the statutes. A court, however, cannot divine the relative
importance of interests absent reference to the constitution itself; it is in the
constitution that competing interests are balanced. A court's proper function is not to
balance interests but to determine what the specific provisions of the constitution
require and to apply those requirements to the case before it. n401
 [*884]   
Thus, for example, in State v. Stoneman, n402 when the state asserted that Oregon's
extraordinarily protective guarantee of free expression should be subject to a balancing as against
the state's strong interest in protecting children against the harmful effects of pornography, the court
demurred: "Article I, section 8, does guarantee freedom of expression without qualification ... and
is, consequently, incompatible with a balancing approach." n403
Yet, for all the court's proud pronouncements about the incompatibility of balancing with
categorical constitutional commands, the Oregon case law reflects a surprising amount of good old-
fashioned federal-type balancing.
Excellent examples may be found in, of all places, cases construing the free expression
guarantees of article I, section 8. Indeed, I already have noted how the Oregon Supreme Court's
decision in In re Fadeley held that, notwithstanding the unqualified prohibition against restraints on
free expression, "not even article I, section 8, is absolute - there are exceptions to its sweep." n404
Similarly, in In re Lasswell, n405 the court held that article I, section 8, is not the absolute
prohibition that it seems to be in other cases. Lasswell was a disciplinary proceeding in which a
prosecutor was charged with violating a rule prohibiting certain extrajudicial statements about
pending litigation. n406 The prosecutor challenged the constitutionality of the rule as a violation of
article I, section 8. The court held that, although the rule certainly restrained speech in a sense, it did
not violate article I, section 8, because, on balance, the prosecutor's rights of free expression were
outweighed by the criminally accused's right to a fair trial. n407
It is hard to understand how the court reconciles either Fadeley or Lasswell with its categorical
rejection of balancing  [*885]  free expression rights in Stoneman. If, as the court said in Stoneman,
the unqualified nature of article I, section 8, renders it "incompatible with a balancing approach,"
the balancing analysis that the court employed in both Fadeley and Lasswell is simply wrong.
Free expression is not the only area in which Oregon courts have engaged in the balancing of
constitutional interests. Recently, they have employed balancing analysis to the privileges and
immunities provision of article I, section 20, as well.
It did not start out that way. Following the Oregon Supreme Court's announcement of its
distinctive approach to privileges and immunities analysis in Clark, the court turned a decidedly
cold shoulder to suggestions that it incorporate the sort of "rational basis" examination that is a
familiar part of federal equal protection analysis. Such analysis balances the individual's
constitutional right of equal protection against the legislature's constitutional power to enact
legislation in the public interest. n408 Classifications - at least those that are not regarded as
inherently "suspect" or those that do not implicate fundamental rights - are upheld as long as they
are supported by a conceivably rational basis. n409 In Hale v. Port of Portland, n410 the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of a cap on governmental tort liability, arguing that the cap had no
rational basis. n411 The court responded that "[this] is a test drawn from federal equal protection
doctrine (and akin to 'balancing') that for purposes of article I, section 20, has been superseded by
our more recent decisions." n412
 [*886]  Yet barely a year after Hale, in Sealey v. Hicks, n413 the court opened the door to the
very rational basis analysis that it earlier had so brusquely rejected. At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of an eight-year statute of ultimate repose for product liability actions. In
upholding the statute against a challenge brought under article I, section 20, the court commented
that "if the legislature attempted to deny a recovery to specific individuals, or to permit the courts to
deny such a recovery to arbitrarily chosen members of the same class, article I, section 20, might be
violated. But that is not the case here." n414 That sounds an awful lot like rational basis analysis,
although the court did not use the precise words. According to the Sealey court's formulation of
article I, section 20, legislative classifications are permissible as long as they are not arbitrary.
That, at least, is the way the court read its Sealey decision in a case decided the following term,
Seto v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation. n415 The plaintiffs in that case challenged a statute
prescribing judicial review procedures for a specific public project, which departed from the review
procedures that ordinarily applied. The court held that the classification was in the nature of a
geographical classification "inherent in any project-specific public works," and that, as such, it was
"tested by whether the legislature had authority to act and whether the clarification has a rational
basis." n416 Sealey was cited as authority. n417 Similarly, in State v. Tucker, n418 in which a
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the state death penalty statute, the court held that
article I, section 20, required that the statute establish "clear, rational, and definite criteria for
determining whether a defendant should receive a life sentence." n419
Since Sealey, the Oregon Court of Appeals likewise has read article I, section 20, to permit
legislative classifications so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate legislative end. For
example, in Withers v. State, n420 the court addressed the constitutionality of a state public school
financing scheme that resulted in  [*887]  significant disparities in spending per pupil from one
district to another. Relying on the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Seto, the court held that
"under article I, section 20, the state may not deny a member of a 'true class' of citizens a privilege
that the state provides to others, unless that difference in treatment has a rational basis." n421
Rational basis examination is not the only form of balancing that the Oregon courts have
adopted in applying article I, section 20. The courts also have determined that, depending on the
nature of the classification, something more demanding than rational basis analysis may be
required. Indeed, in some cases, Oregon's article I, section 20, jurisprudence has taken on a
distinctively federal "feel."
This development actually began at a surprisingly early stage. Barely a year after the publication
of the seminal Clark decision, in Hewitt v. SAIF, n422 the court addressed the constitutionality of a
statute that permitted an unmarried woman to collect workers' compensation death benefits upon the
death of an unmarried man with whom she had cohabited, but made no provision for death benefits
to an unmarried man upon the death of an unmarried woman with whom he cohabited. n423 The
court held that some legislative classifications may be regarded as "inherently suspect" and may
therefore be subject to particularly demanding scrutiny. n424 Gender-based classifications are such
classifications. They may be justified only on the basis of genuine "biological differences." n425
The court of appeals then applied Hewitt in reaching its conclusion in Tanner v. OHSU n426
that legislative and administrative distinctions drawn on the basis of sexual orientation are likewise
"inherently suspect" and may be justified only by genuine differences  [*888]  between homosexual
and heterosexual individuals. n427 At issue in that case was the constitutionality of a state hospital
employee benefits policy that provided health and life insurance benefits to employee spouses but
not to the unmarried domestic partners of its homosexual employees. The state argued that the
policy distinguished only between married and unmarried employees. The court, however, held that,
because homosexual employees could not legally marry, the policy had the effect of discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the effect could not be justified by any differences
between heterosexual and homosexual employees. n428 The court explicitly relied on the suspect
classification analysis of Hewitt in reaching its conclusions. n429
It is perhaps not surprising that the Oregon courts gravitated towards such balancing analyses
under article I, section 20. Notwithstanding the apparently unqualified nature of the text of the
section, it seems obvious that it cannot be read to prohibit all legislative distinctions. In a very real
sense, every legislative enactment draws distinctions, and the constitution cannot be read to prohibit
every legislative enactment. On the other hand, merely because the legislature necessarily must
draw distinctions does not mean that all of its distinctions must be permissible. Otherwise, article I,
section 20, loses any meaning. Thus, it is probably inevitable that even the Oregon courts ultimately
would give in to some form of balancing of the interests of the individual and the constitutional
prerogatives of the legislature. Nevertheless, it is interesting - ironic, even - to observe the extent to
which the Oregon courts, which struggle so hard to maintain a distinctive state constitutional
jurisprudence, have found it necessary to follow federal constitutional practices.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Oregon courts employ a variety of interpretive approaches in assigning meaning to
the Oregon Constitution. The question remains whether there is any sense to the manner in which
the courts do so. Is there, in other words, a pattern or an overriding theory that explains the practice
of Oregon constitutionalism?
 [*889]  The answer, unfortunately, appears to be no. As I have shown, in its decision in Priest
v. Pearce, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted an interpretive approach that, at least on its face,
applies to the construction of all provisions of the Oregon Constitution. But a review of the cases
since the publication of that decision demonstrates that such is simply not the case.
In some cases, the Oregon courts apply the originalist interpretive methodology of the Priest
decision, but in many other cases, they do not. Free expression cases continue to be decided on the
basis of a methodology that was developed in reference to the Federal First Amendment. Until very
recently, cases concerning the solicitation of initiative petition signatures were decided on the basis
of rights inferred from, but not stated in, the text of the state constitution entirely without reference
to original intentions. Takings cases continue to be decided under the expressly stated assumption
that federal and state constitutional takings clauses have identical meaning and effect, without
respect to the text or intended meaning of either one. Cruel and unusual punishment cases are
decided by expressly adopting federal constitutional law without any independent analysis of the
state constitutional provision, text or history. And constitutional provisions enacted by initiative are
subjected to an entirely different interpretive approach patterned after the methodology that the
Oregon courts apply to the construction of statutes.
It is tempting to suggest that the Oregon courts have merely decided to adhere to lines of
authority that existed prior to Priest rather than to re-examine them under the new methodology. But
the fact of the matter is that, even in cases of first impression decided after Priest, the courts have
departed from Priest's originalism. In Whiffen, for example, the court did not mention Priest,
although the case had been decided a year earlier. Similarly, Ecumenical Ministries applied its
"statutory" construction methodology without attempting to distinguish Priest, decided the previous
year.
Moreover, it is difficult to understand how precedent could serve to explain the courts' failure to
apply Priest to all constitutional provisions. By giving independent significance to the Oregon
Constitution, the Oregon courts already had departed from substantial precedents holding that
parallel federal and state constitutional provisions were identical in meaning and effect. Why
[*890]  precedent should prove an insurmountable hurdle in one instance but not in another I do not
understand.
The substance of the constitutional provisions at issue also do not explain the varying
interpretive methodologies that are applied to them. Oregon courts do not, for example, apply
different methodologies depending on whether the provisions at issue are truly "constitutional," as
do some other courts. Likewise, there appears to be no discernible pattern in the substantive nature
of the cases to explain the different interpretive approaches that are brought to bear. Individual
rights cases, for example, are not systematically treated differently from governmental structure
cases. The right to bear arms cases, free expression cases, takings cases, and equal privileges or
immunities cases all are subject to different interpretive approaches.
Complicating matters is the fact that the Oregon courts are fairly flexible in the manner in which
they adhere to their state constitutional interpretive practices. Lock-step application of federal law,
for example, is supposed to be inconsistent with the very premises of state constitutionalism, yet the
Oregon courts continue to do it in many cases. A "first things first" approach similarly is supposed
to foreclose consideration of federal constitutional law before consideration of state constitutional
law regardless of the positions of the parties, yet the courts routinely assume the identity of state
and federal takings law unless the parties argue otherwise. Balancing of constitutional interests is
supposed to be at odds with Oregon constitutional interpretation, yet, in their free expression and
equal privileges or immunities cases, the courts have expressly resorted to balancing.
In short, there appears to be nothing systematic about Oregon's approach to constitutional
interpretation. The courts have merely resorted to the same practices of the federal courts
interpreting the Federal Constitution. That is, the courts apply a variety of approaches depending on
the constitutional provisions at issue, but in ways that reflect no coherent approach to the role of the
courts in assigning meaning to the constitution.
This is no trifling matter of academic technicality. As I noted early on, behind every instance of
judicial construction of a constitution lurks the specter of legitimacy. If state courts such as
Oregon's wish to assert the supremacy of judicial construction of their constitutions, they must be
able to explain their decisions in terms other than the personal preferences of those who make
[*891]  them. The constitutions themselves do not assign the courts such supremacy, after all. In the
absence of a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation, the courts are hard pressed to explain
why their decisions are entitled to the supremacy that so often is claimed for them.
In making these observations, I wish to make clear that I am not suggesting that the Oregon
courts should have adopted a single, monolithic approach to constitutional interpretation, originalist
or otherwise. It may be that there are good reasons to apply different interpretive approaches to
different constitutional provisions. The New Jersey and South Carolina courts, for example, have
articulated a plausible rationale for classifying constitutional provisions and applying different
interpretive approaches to each classification. Other similar approaches may be justifiable.
My point is that there is no evidence that the Oregon courts have made any attempt to think of
constitutional interpretation in any such coherent fashion. In my view, this is truly unfortunate. Over
the last three decades, state courts participating in the state constitutional revolution have had the
opportunity to take a fresh look at the most fundamental questions about constitutional
interpretation and the legitimacy of judicial review. Unencumbered by two centuries of largely
incoherent federal jurisprudence on the subject, state courts have been free to stake out new territory
and make conscious choices about their constitutional interpretive practices. The Oregon courts,
however, have squandered that opportunity. Satisfied with merely departing from federal
jurisprudence, the Oregon courts simply have declined to engage in the difficult task of identifying
a coherent jurisprudence of their own.
Thus, to return to the question that I posed at the outset of this article, it appears clear that
Oregon's constitutional revolution has made a difference in the sense that it has departed from the
lock-step federal constitutional analysis of the past. It also has made a difference in offering original
analyses of specific clauses of the Oregon Constitution. But in a larger sense, in the sense of
offering an improved approach to constitutional theory and legitimate judicial review, the Oregon
constitutional revolution has made no difference at all.
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provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of
individuals. But there is not.... I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific
constitutional provision.
 Id. at 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
For critical commentary on the decision see, for example, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 7-12 (1971) (stating that the Court's opinion is
"unprincipled" and "illegitimate"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 928-29 (1973); and Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,
Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235
(1965).
n33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
n34. Much ink has been spilled over the legitimacy of the Court's decision in Roe. See, e.g.,
Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (1993); Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes
(1990); Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265
(1993); Ely, supra note 32; Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The
Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159; Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance
and Process in the Abortion Debate, 68 Ind. L.J. 269 (1993); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts
on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985); Philip B.
Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L.
Rev. 765 (1973); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 668
(1984); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979); Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral
Uncertainty, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
n35. As the Court explained:
The necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which preceded its
formation, and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly be taken
into view for the purpose of tracing to its source any particular provision of the Constitution in order
thereby to be enabled to correctly interpret its meaning.
 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 95 (1900); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 534, 545 (1959); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) ("The
Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when
adopted, it means now.").
n36. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
n37. The Court noted that, as of 1792, thirteen of the fourteen states that had ratified the
Constitution provided for the prosecution of libel and that all fourteen made blasphemy, profanity,
or both a statutory crime. Id. at 482. The Court further noted that a number of states had made it a
crime to publish "obscene" materials. Id. at 483. Citing eight such states, the Court concluded that
"there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity ... was outside the protection
intended for speech and press." Id.
n38. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell, the Court held that, under Article I,
Section 2, of the Federal Constitution, Congress does not have the authority to exclude one of its
members. Representative Adam Clayton Powell had been re-elected to serve in the 90th Congress
as a representative from a district in New York. Allegations that he had engaged in misconduct
during the previous congressional term, however, led to the appointment of a Select Committee to
determine whether he would be eligible to take a seat in the 90th Congress. The Committee found
that, although Powell met the requirements of Article I, Section 2, he had, indeed, engaged in
misconduct, including diverting House funds for personal use and making false expenditure reports.
As a result of those findings, the House voted to exclude Powell and declared his seat vacant.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court conducted a detailed examination of English and American
legal history concerning qualifications of membership in legislatures to determine the "intent of the
Framers." Id. at 547. The Court found that the "relevant historical materials" revealed that Congress
lacked the power, in effect, to add to the qualifications stated in Article I, Section 2. Id. at 522. The
"relevant historical materials" included records of the English experience with qualifications of
membership in Parliament, the record of the Constitutional Convention, excerpts from The
Federalist, and the first 100 years of congressional practice following the adoption of the
Constitution. Id. at 522-42.
n39. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). The Court framed the issue as
whether the states have authority to "add qualifications" to those listed in Article I, Section 2. Id. at
787. The Court began by explicitly reaffirming the historical analysis in which it engaged in Powell.
Id. at 787-98. But, noting that Powell addressed only the extent to which the Framers would have
understood that Congress lacked the power to add qualifications to Article I, Section 2, the Court
delved back into that history to focus more particularly on the extent to which the Framers likewise
would have understood that the states lacked the same power. Once again, the Court resorted to the
record of the Constitutional Convention, records of the ratification debates, excerpts from The
Federalist, and congressional experience. Id. at 806-19.
n40. See, e.g., Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 240 (1999) ("Death itself was an
acceptable punishment. Life can be extinguished by the state if it provides due process of law to
convict an offender."). On the subject of original intent and the death penalty, see generally H.
Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment (1977), and Raoul Berger, The Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, in The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current
Understanding 303 (Eugene W. Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991).
n41. "The Court recognized ... that the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and
that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
n42. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
n43. Id. at 415.
n44. The commentary on the Court's takings cases is too extensive to be listed here. Interesting
analyses include Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(1985); William Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995); Bruce
Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977); Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our
"Regulatory Takings" Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 Yale L.J. 613 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1165 (1967); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984); and Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
For an overview of the historical evidence as to the intended meaning of the Takings Clause, see
William M. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985). See also Harry N. Scheiber, The "Takings" Clause and
the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent and Significance in American Legal Development, in The
Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current Understanding 233 (Eugene W. Hickock, Jr. ed.,
1991).
n45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For critical analyses of Brown, see, for example, Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955), and
Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 Mich. L.
Rev. 1049 (1956).
n46. Christopher Wolfe, for example, writes:
What was once a distinctively judicial power, essentially different from legislative power, has
become merely another variant of legislative power. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say
that the emergence of judge-made constitutional law has been the most striking characteristic of our
federal courts since the end of the nineteenth century.
 Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to
Judge-Made Law 3 (1986).
n47. It is commonly asserted that the Warren Court's increased reliance on the Federal
Constitution as the basis for protecting individual rights simply rendered state constitutions
irrelevant. See Friesen, supra note 2, 1-1(a) n.10 ("A generation of overreliance by law professors,
judges, and attorneys on the federal doctrines that grew out of the Warren era left state
constitutional law in a condition of near atrophy in some states."); Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 957 (1982) ("As the federal constitutional
guarantees grew during the Warren Court years, the protection of individual rights under the state
constitutions almost came to a halt."); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873, 878 (1976) (noting state courts "fell into the
drowsy habit of looking no further than federal constitutional law"). But the practice of assuming
the essential fungibility of parallel state and federal constitutional provisions seems to have
originated well before the Warren era. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
n48. State v. Cram, 176 Or. 577, 580, 160 P.2d 283, 284 (1945).
n49. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
n50. Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals?, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1481, 1492 (1990); see also John D. Boutwell, The Cause of
Action for Damages Under North Carolina's Constitution: Corum v. University of North Carolina,
70 N.C. L. Rev. 1899, 1910 n.70 (1992) (noting that Justice Brennan "is primarily responsible for
this revamping of federalism"); Steve McAllister, Comment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A
Survey and Assessment of Current Methodology, 35 U. Kan. L. Rev. 593, 593 (1987) ("In 1977,
Justice Brennan gave impetus to the state constitutional law renaissance by publishing an article
advocating state constitutional interpretation.").
n51. Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 Or. L. Rev.
125 (1970). Linde, in turn, contends that "contemporary discussion" of state constitutional
interpretation began even earlier, with the publication of Robert Force, State "Bill of Rights": A
Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val. U. L. Rev. 125 (1969). See Linde, supra
note 17, at 175. Other early articles calling for increased attention to state constitutional
interpretation include Jerome B. Falk, The State Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 273 (1973), and A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights
in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873 (1976).
n52. Oregon, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule long before the United States Supreme
Court did so under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Laundy, 104 Or. 443, 204 P. 958
(1922). So did Iowa. See State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903).
n53. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamism of the "New Judicial Federalism," 2
Emerging Issues in St. Const. L. 233, 235 (1989) ("The revival of interest in state constitutionalism
is generally conceded to be a reaction to the Burger Court's perceived hostility to Warren Court
activism and its extension."). For a review of the Warren Court's significant decisions in their
political context, see Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics (2000). For an
analysis of the more conservative shift in recent Supreme Court decisions, see generally David
Kairys, With Liberty and Justice for Some (1993), and The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the
Supreme Court 1969-1986 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
The United States Supreme Court itself provided further impetus to resort to state constitutional
interpretation with its decision in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), in which the Court
declared that it would not review state court decisions explicitly based on state constitutional law:
When ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven
with federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not
clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state
court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.... If the
state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds, [the Court] ... will not undertake to review the
decision.
 Id. at 1040-01. The Court required that the independent grounds be made clear "by a plain
statement" that any reference to federal law is for the purpose of guidance only and not as a matter
of compelling authority. Id. at 1041.
n54. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - Away from a Reactionary
Approach, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 3-5 (1981); George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr.,
All Sail and No Anchor: Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q.
975 (1979); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional
Law, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 429 (1988).
n55. For an account of the development of this approach to state constitutionalism, see Randall
T. Shepard, The Maturing of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 421 (1996). See
also Tarr, supra note 3, at 841-42 ("State courts' reliance on state constitutions has become less
opportunistic, and their opportunistic use of state constitutions less acceptable.").
Even that more "mature" approach to state constitutionalism has not satisfied some
commentators, however. Perhaps most prominent among the critics of state constitutionalism is
James A. Gardner. His article, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev.
761 (1992), sets forth an extended critique of independent construction of state constitutions.
According to Gardner, "state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting,
and essentially unintelligible pronouncements." Id. at 763. The source of this state of affairs is not a
lack of ingenuity among state judges, but rather that state constitutions are intrinsically incapable of
serving as the basis for a coherent body of law:
I conclude that the failure of state constitutional discourse reflects a much deeper failure, a failure of
state constitutionalism itself. The central premise of state constitutionalism is that a state
constitution reflects the fundamental values, and ultimately the character, of the people of the state
that adopted it. This premise, however, cannot serve as the foundation for a workable state
constitutional discourse because it is not a good description of actual state constitutions; it embraces
theoretical inconsistencies that undermine its value as a framework for coherent discourse; and it
takes an obsolete and potentially dangerous view of the texture and focus of American national
identity.
 Id. at 764. Gardner contrasts this "impoverished" state of affairs with the "extraordinarily rich"
nature of federal constitutional discourse and concludes that state constitutionalism is simply
unnecessary; even worse, he concludes, state constitutionalism threatens the development of a
coherent set of fundamental national moral and political values. Id. at 723-32.
Not surprisingly, Gardner's thesis has generated a considerable amount of controversy. See, e.g.,
Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 493 (1996); Hans A. Linde, State
Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 Rutgers L.J.
927 (1993); David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 274
(1992). It is not my purpose to join the battle in this article. Suffice it to say that, although I share
some of Gardner's skepticism about the coherence of state constitutionalism, I do not share his view
that its source lies in the nature of the beast. In particular, I find his comparison of state and federal
constitutional "discourse" to be unpersuasive. To characterize the nature of federal constitutional
discourse as anything but equally incoherent is wishful thinking, at best. See id. at 277 n.18
("Perhaps I am more reluctant ... to abandon 'impoverished' state constitutionalism in favor of its
'successful,' 'rich,' and 'vigorous' federal analogue because I find recent federal constitutionalism to
be impoverished - not because it is increasingly conservative, but because it is increasingly petulant,
shrill, formulaic, and intellectually incoherent.").
Gardner is not the only critic of state constitutionalism. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 54, at 2
(stating that although rediscovery of state constitutions is a "good omen," too often it has been "used
as a utilitarian device for perpetuating the constitutional expansionism wrought by the Warren
Court"); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
1147, 1160 (1993) (stating that state constitutionalism is rooted in an "anachronism or romantic
myth" of the distinctiveness of state characteristics and identities).
n56. That is, two schools of thought in addition to the "lock-step" approach still adopted by
some states. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 504 N.W.2d 400 (Wis. 1993) ("The law of search and
seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution, however, has been routinely and consistently conformed
to the law developed by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment."). For a
slightly different taxonomy - describing five interpretive approaches - see Peter J. Galie, Modes of
Constitutional Interpretation: The New York Court of Appeals' Search for a Role, 4 Emerging
Issues in St. Const. L. 225 (1991).
n57. See generally Friesen, supra note 2, at 17 ("Truly independent use of state constitutions
requires that courts and counsel ... rely first and solely on state grounds for a decision whenever it is
possible to do so without infringing on a federal right ...."). Oregon is among the states that follow
this approach. See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981) ("The proper
sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal
constitutional claim."). Friesen reports that the other states that follow the first things first approach
include Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Friesen, supra note 2, 1-5(a).
n58. See, e.g., Wallace P. Carson, "Last Things Last": A Methodological Approach to Legal
Argument in State Courts, 19 Willamette L. Rev. 641 (1983); Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980).
n59. Linde, supra note 58, at 383 ("Just as rights under the state constitutions were first in time,
they are first also in the logic of constitutional law."); see also Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614,
625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981) ("This [primary resort to the state constitution] is required, not for the
sake of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the
Federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.").
n60. See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1005 (Utah 1994) ("Another
practical reason for adhering to a consistent method of addressing state and federal constitutional
issues is the time and expense saved by avoiding multiple trips through state and federal appellate
courts.") (Hall, J., concurring); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 750 (La. 1992) ("An improper by-
pass of a state constitutional or legal question by this court may result in an unnecessary federal
constitutional decision, a remand of the case by the Supreme Court, or both.").
n61. Judge Rex Armstrong, of the Oregon Court of Appeals, explained the point in these terms:
State judges are obliged to interpret their state constitutions independently, if they are to do the job
that they have been given.
When I became a judge on the Oregon Court of Appeals, I took an oath to support the Oregon
Constitution. That means, in a case before our court involving a challenge to the validity of a state
statute under the Oregon Constitution, I am obliged to uphold the constitution. To do that, I have to
decide what the constitution means. That is the task assigned to me as a state judge.
 Armstrong, supra note 55, at 494-95 (1996); see also Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809
P.2d 809, 835 (Cal. 1991) ("We are not a branch of the federal judiciary; we are a court created by
the Constitution of California and we owe our primary obligation to that fundamental document.")
(Mosk, J., concurring); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983):
When state constitutional issues have been raised, this court has a responsibility to make an
independent determination of the protections afforded under the New Hampshire Constitution. If we
ignore this duty, we fail to live up to our oath to defend our constitution and we help to destroy the
federalism that must be so carefully safeguarded by our people.
n62. See Friesen, supra note 2, 1-4(e) ("Some state supreme courts, and many advocates,
analyze an overlapping state constitutional claim only when they are dissatisfied with the result that
would be dictated by current federal doctrine."); see also Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 707, 718 (1983). States that follow
this approach include Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Upton, 458 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1983), New
Jersey, State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990), and Rhode Island, Pimental v. Dep't of Transp.,
561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989).
n63. Friesen, supra note 2, 1-4(e) ("This selective use of state law reflects a view that the state
constitution is a supplemental, rather than a first line source of constitutional rights."); see also
Project, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 1324, 1356-67 (1982) (stating that state constitutional interpretation should only be invoked as
supplement when protection under Federal Constitution is unavailable).
n64. As one prominent commentator has complained:
What is striking is how little attention scholars and jurists have paid to the relationship between
constitutional theory and state constitutional law. Constitutional theorists have continued to
announce theories of constitutional interpretation that are really only theories of how to interpret a
single constitution - the rough equivalent of announcing a literary theory that pertains to but a single
work. More important for our purposes, state jurists and state constitutional scholars, with a few
isolated exceptions, have ignored recent constitutional theory in interpreting state constitutions.
 Tarr, supra note 3, at 842-43. The few exceptions tend to address the subject in broad, theoretical
terms. David Keyser, for example, illustrated several different schools of interpretation by means of
mock opinions. David R. Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories of Judicial Review: Some
Variations on a Theme, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1051 (1985). Thomas Morawetz similarly outlines the
possibilities in general terms, focusing on originalism and various "nonoriginalist" alternatives.
Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 635 (1994). Rachel Van Cleave focuses mainly on the
questions of whether and when to engage in state constitutional interpretation, but briefly addresses
at the end of her article the debate over originalism as an appropriate method of interpretation.
Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 199
(1998). Harold Levinson also authored a short article narrowly focusing on the use of Constitutional
Convention records in state constitutional cases. L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State
Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 567 (1978).
n65. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). The court listed the various approaches not as
mutually exclusive alternatives:
Thus, it is important that the attorney consider the various approaches that can be taken to state
constitutional argument. We will outline some of them in the paragraphs that follow. The advocate
in appellate argument may wish to combine several of these approaches, having in mind that any
collegial tribunal contains members with varying legal backgrounds and philosophies. What is
appealing to one justice may be unpersuasive to another. Therefore, wise counsel will use every tool
available in his or her efforts to convince.
 Id. at 236.
n66. Id. at 237.
n67. Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 832 (N.J. 1977). James Gray Pope supports the New Jersey
court's attempt to divide the state constitution into constitutional and constitutional (he uses a shift
in typeface to signal the distinction) provisions, but asserts that the court's emphasis on the subject
matter of a particular provision as the litmus test is untenable. James Gray Pope, An Approach to
State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 Rutgers L.J. 985 (1993). According to Pope, characterizing a
provision according to its subject matter is entirely arbitrary. He urges that courts should make the
distinction by reference to the extent to which it truly was "enacted by the people." Id. at 996-99.
Whether an enactment may be regarded as having been truly enacted by the people depends on
"such factors as the quality ... and duration of public discussion, the rate of voter participation, and
the sharpness with which the issue is presented." Id. at 998. For a critique of Pope's proposal, see
James A. Gardner, What Is a State Constitution?, 24 Rutgers L.J. 1033 (1993).
n68. Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 832.
n69. Id.
n70. Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).
n71. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 189 (1998) ("While state
constitutions contain statements of broad principle, they also contain a range of other provisions of
varying detail and specificity, including some that resemble statutes. This raises the question of
whether a single interpretive approach is appropriate for the disparate provisions.").
n72. Unlike most states, Oregon has not wholly revised its constitution since the original was
enacted, although it has been amended a number of times since then. See generally Tarr, supra note
71, at 23-24 (noting that only nineteen states retain their original constitutions, and most have
established three or more). Like most states - at least most western states - Oregon's constitution
largely consists of provisions borrowed from other states' constitutions, principally Indiana's. See
generally W.C. Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 Or. L. Rev. 200 (1926).
n73. The principal source of information about the convention is Carey's compilation of portions
of the journal of proceedings and newspaper reports from the Weekly Oregonian and the Oregon
Statesman, the newspapers of Portland and Salem, respectively. The Oregon Constitution and
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 (Charles H. Carey ed., 1926)
[hereinafter The Oregon Constitution]. The "journal," however, contained little information
concerning the substance of the debates, and the newspaper accounts are not entirely reliable; the
editor of each of the two papers was a delegate to the convention, and the reporting of the
proceedings was not always unbiased. See David Schuman, The Creation of the Oregon
Constitution, 74 Or. L. Rev. 611, 622 (1995).
n74. The convention devoted nearly a week to the "Judicial Department Article," but the issues
were mostly arcane: jurisdiction of county courts, the organization of grand juries, number and
terms of supreme court justices, and the like. The Oregon Constitution, supra note 73, at 185-96,
212-17; see also Schuman, supra note 73, at 623-24. The Judicial Department Article that the
convention adopted in 1857 was almost wholly revised in 1910. Id. The most lively debate during
the convention concerning the judiciary occurred during consideration of a state bill of rights,
specifically concerning the extent to which judges - as opposed to juries - would have the final say
as to questions of law in jury trials. Several delegates vigorously supported the supreme authority of
juries, decrying the institution of a "judicial monarchy." The Oregon Constitution, supra note 73, at
314.
n75. On the interpretive conventions of the nineteenth century, see William D. Popkin, Statutes
in Court: The History and Thoery of Statutory Interpretation (1999); Hans W. Baade, "Original
Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Historical Glosses, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1001 (1991); William S.
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 Cardozo L. Rev.
799 (1985); and R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 121
(1994). See also G. A. Endlich, A Commentary on the Interpretation of Statutes (1888); Theodore
Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory
and Constitutional Law 241 (1857); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 427-55 (1833).
n76. The Oregon courts never referred to "originalism" as an interpretive approach, but they
frequently referred to the framers' intentions or, more generally, the purpose or "object" of the
disputed constitutional provision. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 288, 29 P. 1028, 1028 (1892)
("The history and object of this constitutional provision, and the mischief against which it was
aimed, should be kept steadily in view."); Rugh v. Ottenheimer, 6 Or. 231, 234 (1877) ("It is a rule
in construing constitutions ... that we look to the circumstances which surrounded the law given at
the time it was enacted, and ascertain if we can, the object of the law and the right to be
protected."); Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Or. 515, 517 (1869) (rejecting proposed construction because
"such a construction we apprehend was never contemplated by the convention").
n77. See, e.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Lord, 28 Or. 498, 535-36, 43 P. 471, 480-82 (1896) (noting
that a proposed construction "has, for almost a quarter of a century, received a practical exposition
to the contrary by executive and legislative departments, each of which is as much bound to obey
the constitution as the courts; and to this exposition the courts would be bound to yield ... unless
satisfied that it is repugnant to the plain provisions of the constitution"). For similar explanations,
see Eddy v. Kincaid, 28 Or. 537, 558, 41 P. 156, 158 (1895); State ex rel. Taylor v. Pennoyer, 26
Or. 205, 212, 37 P. 906, 906 (1894); Templeton v. Linn County, 22 Or. 313, 327, 29 P. 795, 800
(1892); Biggs v. McBride, 17 Or. 640, 650-51, 21 P. 878, 881 (1889); and Cline v. Greenwood, 10
Or. 230, 240 (1882).
n78. The court was especially fond of citing to standard treatises concerning statutory and
constitutional construction, in particular the treatises of Cooley and Sedgwick. See, e.g., Philomath
Coll. v. Wyatt, 27 Or. 390, 453-54, 31 P. 206, 218 (1892) (citing Cooley); David v. Portland Water
Comm., 14 Or. 98, 119, 12 P. 174, 183 (1886) (citing Cooley); Putnam v. Douglas County, 6 Or.
328, 331 (1877) (citing Sedgwick); Fleischner v. Chadwick, 5 Or. 152, 155 (1877) (citing
Sedgwick).
n79. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bell v. Frazier, 36 Or. 178, 182-83, 59 P. 5, 7 (1899) (relying on
construction of similar provision in New York Constitution); Northup v. Hoyt, 31 Or. 524, 529, 49
P. 754, 755 (1897) (referring to construction of New Hampshire Constitution); Warren v. Crosby,
24 Or. 558, 567, 34 P. 661, 664 (1893) (referring to construction of New Jersey Constitution); State
v. Wright, 14 Or. 365, 371, 12 P. 708, 710 (1887) (referring to construction of Louisiana
Constitution); Fleischner v. Chadwick, 5 Or. 152, 155 (1874) (referring to construction of Maryland
Constitution).
n80. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
n81. Or. Const. art. I, 20.
n82. 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567 (1919).
n83. Id. at 59, 184 P.2d at 570.
n84. 212 Or. 430, 437, 320 P.2d 245, 248 (1958); see also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 703, 281
P.2d 698, 701 (1955) (holding that state and federal equal privileges and immunities clauses "are
alike in that they constitute similar limitations upon legislative action for the protection of the
individual from arbitrary or capricious legislation").
n85. Cereghino v. State Highway Comm'n, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d 694 (1962).
n86. State v. Cram, 176 Or. 577, 580, 160 P.2d 283, 284 (1945); see also State v. Hennesey, 195
Or. 355, 365, 245 P.2d 875, 880 (1952) (giving identical construction to Fifth Amendment and
article I, section 12, self-incrimination clauses).
n87. 229 Or. 308, 367 P.2d 403 (1961).
n88. Id. at 320-21, 367 P.2d at 405-06.
n89. 242 Or. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
n90. The plaintiff was a deputy sheriff - a civil service position - who announced his intention to
run for the elected position of county sheriff. State law prohibited a civil service employee from
running for public office unless he or she immediately resigned upon announcing candidacy for the
public office. The plaintiff argued that, among other things, the statute violated his rights of free
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment and by article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution. The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, but cited only First
Amendment cases in the process. Id. at 499-507, 411 P.2d at 73-77.
n91. 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
n92. Id. at 15-16, 554 P.2d at 142-43.
n93. Id. at 16, 554 P.2d at 143.
n94. Id. at 20, 554 P.2d at 145.
n95. 289 Or. 757, 619 P.2d 217 (1980).
n96. Id. at 774-75, 619 P.2d at 227.
n97. Id.
n98. Linde, supra note 51.
n99. The broader focus of the article was "the constitutional premises for judicial review of
regulatory policies." Id. at 126. More particularly, Linde wished to comment on two recent Oregon
Supreme Court decisions, Leathers v. City of Burns, 251 Or. 206, 444 P.2d 1010 (1968), and State
v. Fetterly, 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (1969), both of which implicated a "due process" right
originating in the state and federal constitutions. Linde suggested that, in reviewing those decisions
and others like them, it is important to establish the "constitutional premises," including the sources
of such rights as the "due process" right that the court mentioned. Linde, supra note 51, at 129-35.
In that context, Linde proceeded to examine the question of whether there existed a "due process"
right under the Oregon Constitution. After examining a number of potential sources of such a right
under the state constitution, Linde proclaimed that "the central and essential fact in this examination
is not what is found in these sections, but what is not there. Oregon has no 'due process' clause." Id.
at 135. In conducting this examination, Linde emphasized the differences between the texts of the
federal and state constitutions as well as differences in the historical contexts in which each was
enacted. Comparing the privileges or immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, Linde noted the differences in texts,
adding that "the difference in the two constitutional texts is not happenstance. They were placed in
different constitutions at different times by different men to enact different historic concerns into
constitutional policy." Id. at 141. In concluding the article, Linde offered broader suggestions
concerning the proper analysis of state regulatory policies. It is here that Linde set out his
justification for state constitutional interpretation generally:
The logic of constitutional law demands that nonconstitutional issues be disposed of first, state
constitutional decisions second, and federal constitutional issues last....
Where a state law unavoidably faces a serious claim of constitutional right, the basis for that
claim in the state constitution should be examined first, before any issue under the Federal
Fourteenth Amendment. To begin with the federal claim, as is customarily done, implicitly admits
that the guarantees of the state's constitution are ineffective to protect the asserted right and that
only the intervention of the Federal Constitution stands between the claimant and the state.... In the
fields of freedom of ideas, criminal procedure, and compensation for the taking of property, there is
no reason to accept such an assumption that the values enshrined in a state's constitution, in, say,
1859, must today fall short of those in the Federal Bill of Rights of 1789. And to add a reference to
the corresponding state provision as an afterthought to a holding under the federal guarantee is
worse than merely backwards: A holding that a state constitutional provision protects the asserted
claim in fact destroys the premise for a holding that the state is denying what the Federal
Constitution would assure.
 Id. at 182.
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657, 556 P.2d 1340 (1976). After noting that Linde "strongly argued" that article I, section 10,
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deprivation of the interests specified in the respective provisions of the Federal and Oregon
Constitutions without fair procedures generally associated with the term 'due process.'" Id. at 667-
68, 556 P.2d at 1346.
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n106. The court upheld the constitutionality of a rule of the Oregon Court of Appeals that
prohibited parties appearing pro se from presenting oral argument. The court began by noting that
the Equal Protection Clause and article I, section 20, "are not identical," but then went on to hold,
without explanation, that "it is not invidious discrimination" to maintain such a rule. Id. at 418-19,
600 P.2d at 391-92.
n107. Id. at 417 n.1, 600 P.2d at 391 n.1.
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n109. Id. at 361-62, 614 P.2d at 95.
n110. Id. at 363-70, 614 P.2d at 95-99.
n111. See infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
n112. That is not to say that there is a clearly defined approach to the construction of the Second
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the amendment amounts
to a guarantee of an individual citizen's right to bear arms free from state and federal government
regulation or merely a guarantee of the state's right to regulate gun ownership free of federal
interference. See generally Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 26, at 14.2; Randy E. Barnett & Don B.
Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus as the Second Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 1139 (1996);
Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic
Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 57 (1995); Don B. Kates, Handgun Protection and the Original
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Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989).
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n114. Id. at 233, 630 P.2d at 812.
n115. Brief for Defendant at 9, State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 630 P.2d 810 (1981).
n116. The court noted that the defendant had cited only a decision of the Supreme Court of
California, which was based on the California State Constitution. Clark, 291 Or. at 235-36, 630 P.2d
at 813-14.
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pitching his attack on 14th amendment grounds." Id. at 233 n.1, 630 P.2d at 812 n.1.
n118. The court cited State v. Spada, 286 Or. 305, 594 P.2d 815 (1979). In that case, the
defendant had argued that he had a constitutional right to certain discovery information from the
prosecution. He did not address whether the statute entitled him to the information but rested his
claim solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addressing the defendant's
argument, the court in Spada commented that:
Defendant puts the cart before the horse. It is basic that determination of Oregon statutory law is
antecedent to any claim under the federal constitution, because the State does not violate any of a
defendant's constitutional rights if, under this court's interpretation of the controlling statutes, those
rights are in fact protected.
 Id. at 309, 594 P.2d at 817.
n119. Clark, 291 Or. at 235-41, 630 P.2d at 813-17.
n120. For an overview of Federal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Rotunda
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(1891).
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absconding debtor. An 1889 state statute made it unlawful to arrest sailors for debt. The constable
was fined $ 20, and, when he failed to pay the fine, he was imprisoned. In his habeas corpus
petition, he challenged the constitutionality of the 1889 statute on the ground that it was "class
legislation" prohibited by article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. The court rejected his
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the opinion of Justice Stephen Field in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885). In re Oberg, 21
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judicial powers.
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any duties connected with their respective offices; and the compensation of officers, if not fixed by
this constitution, shall be provided by law.
 Or. Const. art. XIII, 1 (repealed 1956).
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n174. See State v. Conger, 319 Or. 484, 878 P.2d 1089 (1994).
n175. See Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998).
n176. See McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or. 426, 909 P.2d 846 (1996).
n177. See generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5
Const. Comment. 77, 79 (1988) (noting that originators of Federal Constitution "were clearly
hospitable to the use of original intent in the sense of ratifier intent, which is the original intent in a
constitutional sense"); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 375
n.130 (1981) ("The intentions of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive."); Brest,
supra note 21, at 215 ("If the intent of the framers is to be attributed to the provision, it must be
because the other adopters have in effect delegated their intention-votes to the framers.").
n178. 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957).
n179. Id. at 367, 315 P.2d at 801.
n180. 153 Or. 278, 56 P.2d 1093 (1936).
n181. Id. at 289, 56 P.2d at 1097.
n182. See, e.g., Bryant v. Thompson, 324 Or. 141, 147-48, 922 P.2d 1219, 1221-22 (1996);
State v. Boots, 315 Or. 572, 592, 848 P.2d 76, 87 (1993).
n183. See, e.g., Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 70, 987 P.2d 463, 468-69 (1999); State
v. Cookman, 324 Or. 19, 29-30, 920 P.2d 1086, 1092-93 (1996); State v. Conger, 319 Or. 484, 499,
878 P.2d 1089, 1097 (1994).
n184. In State v. Delgado, the Oregon Supreme Court observed:
Charles Dickens, in his novel Martin Chuzzlewit, published in 1842 shortly after his return from
America, referred to a certain Scadder, who "picked his teeth with a sort of young bayonet that flew
out of his knife when he touched a spring." This suggests that America could have been the origin
of the switchblade.
 298 Or. 395, 403 n.6, 692 P.2d 610, 614 n.6 (1984).
n185. 324 Or. 19, 920 P.2d 1086 (1996).
n186. Id. at 28-29, 920 P.2d at 1091-92.
n187. Strong v. State, 1 Blackf. 193, 196 (Ind. 1822).
n188. Cookman, 324 Or. at 31, 920 P.2d at 1093 (emphasis added).
n189. Access to legal materials was notoriously difficult in the pre-war West. Oregon adopted
the Iowa code as its territorial code, for example, simply because the only copies of statutes in the
territory in the 1840s were from Iowa. F.I. Herriott, Transplanting Iowa's Laws to Oregon, 5 Or.
Hist. Q. 139, 143 (1904). There may have been at least some access to Indiana Reports at the time
of the convention, as there are citations to Blackford's Reports in a few pre-1857 decisions. Baldro
v. Tolmie, 1 Or. 176, 177 (1855); Day v. Kent, 1 Or. 123, 128 (1854); Knighton v. Burns, 10 Or.
549, 552 (1847). The point remains, however, that the Oregon courts are content merely to assume
the framers' access to and knowledge of such reports.
n190. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057 (1990) (asserting the inevitability of the problem, but
insisting that it does not render constitutional analysis wholly arbitrary). Some originalists insist that
there is less to the problem than meets the eye. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, argues that the
proper role of the judge is to articulate "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Michael Perry similarly argues that a judge
"should try not to articulate the most general aspect of the original understanding of a constitutional
provision at a level of generality any broader than the relevant materials ... warrant." Michael J.
Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 Va. L. Rev.
669, 679 (1991). Of course, such arguments are question begging. The choice of articulating "the
most specific level" of generality itself cannot be justified by resort to the historical materials and
instead reflects other values brought into the analysis. Moreover, there is no objective definition of
what in fact is "the most specific level" of generality.
n191. 122 Or. App. 540, 858 P.2d 1315 (1993).
n192. Id. at 544, 858 P.2d at 1318.
n193. Id. at 549, 858 P.2d at 1321.
n194. Id. at 557, 858 P.2d at 1326 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
n195. Or. Const. art. I, 8.
n196. 224 Or. 337, 356 P.2d 495 (1960).
n197. Id. at 346-47, 356 P.2d at 499-500.
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n200. Id. at 346-47, 356 P.2d at 499-500.
n201. Id. at 348, 356 P.2d at 500.
n202. Id. at 350-51, 356 P.2d at 501.
n203. Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (1960).
n204. Stanley Brubaker, for example, writes:
There exists what we might call a romantic understanding of the original intent of the First
Amendment's speech and press clauses.... But since 1960, none has been able to claim plausibly that
if this is the only meaning of free speech, it is the one intended by those who wrote and ratified the
First Amendment.
 Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press, in The Bill of Rights:
Original Meaning and Current Understanding 82, 83 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
n205. Levy updated and revised his work in Leonard W. Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press
(1985). In the more recent publication, Levy has retreated from the assertion that the framers
intended merely to incorporate the common law. He now acknowledges that the press actually
enjoyed a remarkable freedom before the turn of the century and that some of the framers expressed
a broader view of the First Amendment than is reflected in Blackstone's Commentaries.
Nevertheless, he adheres to his principal contention that meaningful conceptions of free expression
did not emerge until after passage of the Sedition Act of 1798. Id. at x-xii. For a critical review of
the more recent work, see David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom
of Expression in Early American History, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 795 (1985).
n206. 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
n207. Or. Rev. Stat. 163.275(1)(e) (1981).
n208. The defendant had demurred to the indictment on that ground, and the state appealed.
Robertson, 293 Or. at 404, 649 P.2d at 571.
n209. The Robertson analysis is variously characterized in terms of a two-part test, see, e.g.,
Fidanque v. State ex rel. Oregon Gov't Standards and Practices Comm'n., 328 Or. 1, 5-6, 969 P.2d
376, 378 (1998), or a four-part test, see, e.g., State v. Stoneman, 323 Or. 536, 543-46, 920 P.2d 535,
539-41 (1996).
n210. Robertson, 293 Or. at 411-12, 649 P.2d at 575-76 (footnotes omitted).
n211. Id. at 416-17, 649 P.2d at 578-79.
n212. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
n213. Id. at 447.
n214. Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1163 (1970).
n215. Hans Linde writes:
The first amendment, however, is addressed expressly to lawmakers. It is not, in the first instance,
an instruction to courts directing judges to protect freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
That judicial role indeed follows from judicial review. But the apprehension expressed in the first
amendment is that legislators might decide to establish a religion, or prohibit the exercise of
another, or suppress disfavored speech or publications by law, not that executive officers might do
so illegally. So the first amendment forbade Congress to make such laws long before a judicial role
in defining those freedoms was established.
 Id. at 1175.
n216. Id. at 1183.
n217. Id. at 1179.
n218. Id. at 1175.
n219. Hans Linde writes:
Rarely is there any political incentive to initiate and carry out an effort to repeal repressive laws
against unpopular and annoying forms of speech. It is a quixotic undertaking, thankless and very
likely futile. Who would have bothered to try to repeal Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act in the
decades since all danger from the Wobblies must have been forgotten? Who would propose
legislation to "legalize" revolutionary propaganda, or obscenity, or other offensive expression? We
have long ago come to rely on the courts to clean out the statute books when it no longer matters.
 Id. at 1181.
n220. Id. at 1182.
n221. David Schuman, for example, has observed that "Oregon free speech law ... derives from
a Stanford Law Review Article," citing to Linde's Clear and Present Danger article. Schuman, supra
note 7, at 283. Judge Rex Armstrong similarly observed that "Oregon's free-speech analysis is based
on an analysis presented by then-Professor Linde in a 1970 article published in the Stanford Law
Review." Armstrong, supra note 55, at 499. Bill Long traces the Robertson analysis both to the
Clear and Present Danger article and to a symposium speech that Linde presented at Willamette
University College of Law. William R. Long, Requiem for Robertson: The Life and Death of a
Free-Speech Framework in Oregon, 34 Willamette L. Rev. 101, 105-06 (1998).
n222. State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 412, 649 P.2d 569, 576 (1982).
n223. Id.
n224. 299 Or. 691, 705 P.2d 740 (1985).
n225. The statute, ORS 166.065, provided:
(1) A person commits the crime of harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another
person, the actor:
....
(d) Subjects another to alarm by conveying a telephonic or written threat to inflict serious
physical injury on that person or to commit a felony involving the person or property of that person
or any member of that person's family, which threat reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.
 Or. Rev. Stat. 166.065(1)(d)(1985).
n226. The court noted that only seven states had such statutes. Moyle, 229 Or. at 696, 705 P.2d
at 744. The Oregon territorial legislature did enact such a statute as well, in 1850, but the statute
was repealed in 1853. Id.
n227. 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987).
n228. The obscenity statute, ORS 167.087, provided:
A person commits the crime of disseminating obscene material if the person[ ] knowingly makes,
exhibits, sells, delivers or provides, or offers or agrees to make, exhibit, sell, deliver or provide, or
has in possession with intent to exhibit, sell, deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture, motion
picture, films, slides, drawings or other visual reproduction.
 Or. Rev. Stat. 167.087(1)(1985).
n229. The English recognized the authority of the state to regulate obscene conduct at common
law as early as 1663. See Le Roy v. Sr. Charles Sedley, 1 Keble 620 (K.B. 1663). Regulation of
obscene literature was recognized in Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789 (K.B. 1727). Most early cases were
concerned with the blasphemous character of obscenity. But, by the early nineteenth century, a
wholly secular crime of obscene libel had become well recognized. See generally Frederick F.
Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 6 (1976) ("By the beginning of the 19th century, however, the
common-law crime of obscene libel had matured and was used against works which were purely
sexual in content, without the necessity of political or religious implications.").
In America, obscenity was first regulated by statute in Massachusetts in 1711. See Ancient
Charter, Colony Laws and Province Laws of Massachusetts Bay (1814). Still, other colonies did not
follow suit until nearly a century later, probably because the substantial influence of religion on
earlier colonial culture made such statutes unnecessary. See generally Morris L. Ernst & Alan U.
Schwartz, Censorship: The Search for the Obscene 9-10 (1968); Martha Alshuler, Origins of the
Law of Obscenity, 2 Technical Report of the Comm'n on Obscenity and Pornography 65, 75 (1971).
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, most states had enacted anti-obscenity statutes. See Daniel
Barnhart, The Oregon Bill of Rights and Obscenity: How Jurisprudence Confounded Constitutional
History, 70 Or. L. Rev. 907 (1991).
n230. An 1853 territorial statute made it unlawful for any person to "import, print, publish, sell
or distribute any book or any pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing containing obscene
language ... manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." Or. Stat., ch. 11, 10
(1853).
n231. 315 Or. 372, 845 P.2d 1284 (1993).
n232. ORS 759.290 provides that "no person shall use an automatic dialing and announcing
device to solicit the purchase of any realty, goods or services." Or. Rev. Stat. 759.290(1) (1999).
n233. The state pointed out, for example, that in 1932, the United States Supreme Court had
held that regulation of commercial advertisement did not violate federal equal protection
guarantees, Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932), and that ten years later, the Court held that a
constitutional right to distribute commercial advertisements could not be acquired by printing
protected speech on the back side, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Moser, 315 Or. at
377, 845 P.2d at 1286-87.
n234. The court's entire discussion of the state's historical exception argument was: "The cases
cited by [the state] lend little support to the notion that restrictions on advertising or commercial
solicitations were well established when the 'first American guarantees of freedoms of expression
were adopted.' As in State v. Henry, defendants have not established an historical exception."
Moser, 315 Or. at 378, 845 P.2d at 1287 (citations omitted).
n235. See, e.g., Long, supra note 221, at 119 ("The implication of this approach to history when
evaluating free speech claims is roughly the equivalent of setting the high-jump bar at 7' 0" in a
junior high track meet: It is virtually impossible to clear."); Barnhart, supra note 229, at 917 ("One
can never know whether an exception is 'well established' until the court says so.").
n236. 310 Or. 548, 802 P.2d 31 (1990).
n237. Canons 7B(7) and 7D of the Code of Judicial Conduct ... provided:
B. A judge may not:
....
(7) personally solicit campaign contributions; but a judge may establish committees to secure
and manage financing and expenses to promote the judge's election and to obtain public statements
of support for the judge's candidacy;
....
D. The provisions of this canon apply to each judge in the state at all times and to any other
person who becomes a candidate for an elective judicial office.
 Fadeley, 310 Or. at 550-51, 802 P.2d at 32-33.
n238. Id. at 552, 802 P.2d at 33-34.
n239. Id. at 559, 802 P.2d at 37.
n240. Id. at 559, 802 P.2d at 38.
n241. The court noted that, in 1976, the people enacted an amendment to article VII, section 8,
which contained a specific reference to the right of the court to discipline judges for "wilful
violation of any rule of judicial conduct." Or. Const. art. VII, 8 (amended 1976). The court then
held that "when the people, in the face of a pre-existing right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever, adopt a constitutional amendment that by its fair import modifies that pre-existing
right, the later amendment must be given its due." Fadeley, 310 Or. at 560, 802 P.2d at 38.
n242. Fadeley, 310 Or. at 561, 802 P.2d at 38-39 ("The right to speak, write, or print freely on
any subject whatever, is not absolute. It may be curtailed, for example, in the regulation of certain
professions."). The court cited as an example the regulation of public comments by district attorneys
during the course of a trial. In the case of In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983), it
upheld such a regulation because, on balance, the interests of the criminally accused outweighed the
interests of the district attorney to speak freely. Fadeley, 310 Or. at 563, 802 P.2d at 40.
n243. Justice Richard Unis, joined by Justice George Van Hoomisen, dissented on precisely
those grounds. According to the dissent, the majority departed from the Robertson analysis and, in
particular, created too broad an exception to the protections of article 1, section 8. Fadeley, 310 Or.
at 580-91, 802 P.2d at 50-57 (Unis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
n244. 323 Or. 536, 920 P.2d 535 (1996).
n245. ORS 163.680 provided:
It is unlawful for any person to pay or give anything of value to observe sexually explicit conduct
by a child known by the person to be under 18 years of age, or to pay or give anything of value to
obtain or view a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual reproduction of sexually
explicit conduct by a child under 18 years of age.
 Or. Rev. Stat. 163.680(1) (1995).
n246. Stoneman, 323 Or. at 541, 920 P.2d at 538.
n247. As in Henry, the state in Stoneman argued that the 1853 territorial statute constituted a
historical exception. The court responded that "without more, that territorial statute did not
sufficiently and clearly establish [an] historical exception within which the statute under review in
the present case could be said 'wholly' to fall." Id. at 545, 920 P.2d at 541.
n248. Id.
n249. Id. at 546, 920 P.2d at 541.
n250. Id. at 548, 920 P.2d at 542.
n251. Free expression is not the only area in which the court has resorted to atextual or
ahistorical doctrine to give meaning to the constitution. The court has employed similar practices in
the area of search and seizure law. In State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988), for
example, the court defined what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of article I, section 9, of
the Oregon Constitution. In so doing, however, the court did not engage in any historical analysis to
determine what the framers would have understood the term to mean. It instead adopted almost
verbatim a definition proposed in a law review article in the Minnesota Law Review concerning the
Fourth Amendment, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349 (1974).
n252. 315 Or. 500, 849 P.2d 446 (1993).
n253. Id. at 503, 849 P.2d at 447-48.
n254. Id. at 504, 849 P.2d at 448.
n255. Or. Const. art. IV, 1.
n256. Whiffen, 315 Or. at 504, 849 P.2d at 448.
n257. Defendants claimed that the Lloyd Center's restrictions "virtually eliminated petitioning
without significantly advancing legitimate interests" of private property owners. According to
defendants, "if expressive rights are now to be unnecessarily burdened, then this entire enterprise
will sink like a stone." Petition for Review of Defendants at 14, 17, Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 315 Or.
500, 849 P.2d 446 (1993).
n258. Whiffen, 315 Or. at 504, 849 P.2d at 448.
n259. It was not until Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), that the United States Supreme
Court held that members of the public may have a First Amendment right to engage in the exercise
of their rights of free expression on at least some private property, in that case, a "company town."
It was not until 1968, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), that the Court first held that shopping centers might be subject to the same
treatment as the sidewalks in the company town in Marsh.
n260. Whiffen, 315 Or. at 511, 849 P.2d at 452.
n261. Id. (quoting Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 363 (Mich. 1985)
(Williams, J., dissenting)).
n262. Id. at 512, 849 P.2d at 452 (quoting State v. Cargill, 100 Or. App. 336, 343, 786 P.2d 208,
211 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court, 316 Or. 492, 851 P.2d 1141 (1993)) (emphasis
added).
n263. Id. at 512, 849 P.2d at 452-53.
n264. Id. (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 307 Or. 674, 684, 773 P.2d 1294, 1299 (1989)).
n265. Id. at 512-13, 849 P.2d at 453.
n266. Id. at 513, 849 P.2d at 453.
n267. Marsh v, Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
n268. Id.
n269. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 315 Or. 500, 506, 849 P.2d 446, 449 (1993).
n270. Id.
n271. See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
n272. Whiffen, 315 Or. at 506-07, 849 P.2d at 449.
n273. Chief Justice Carson and Justice Peterson joined in the dissent. Id. at 528-56, 849 P.2d at
461-77 (Gillette, J., dissenting).
n274. Id. at 544 n.7, 849 P.2d at 470 n.7.
n275. 100 Or. App. 336, 786 P.2d 208 (1990).
n276. Id. at 344, 786 P.2d at 212.
n277. State v. Cargill, 316 Or. 492, 851 P.2d 1141 (1993).
n278. 316 Or. 448, 853 P.2d 1285 (1993).
n279. The court noted:
It was incumbent on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the Fred Meyer "one-
stop shopping center" within the Center in this case was not analogous to the shopping center in
Whiffen.... This the state utterly failed to do ....
 Id. at 461-62, 853 P.2d at 1292.
n280. Id. at 462, 853 P.2d at 1293.
n281. Id. at 471, 853 P.2d at 1299 (Unis, J., concurring).
n282. Id. at 472-88, 853 P.2d at 1299-1308 (Tongue, J., concurring).
n283. Justice Tongue actually suggested that the court needed no test at all, but rather should be
content to decide whether article IV, section 1, applies on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 476, 853 P.2d
at 1302. If the court wanted a test anyway, he said, it should adopt the test employed in State v.
Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). Id.
n284. Id. at 476-77, 853 P.2d at 1302.
n285. Id. at 479, 853 P.2d at 1304.
n286. Id. at 483-84, 853 P.2d at 1306.
n287. Tongue cited both Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd,
447 U.S. 74 (1980), and State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). Dameron, 316 Or. at 479-83,
853 P.2d at 1304-06.
n288. Id. at 464, 853 P.2d at 1294 (Fadeley, J., concurring).
n289. Id. at 491, 853 P.2d at 1310 (Gillette, J., dissenting).
n290. Id. at 490, 853 P.2d at 1310 (Peterson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
n291. 141 Or. App. 541, 920 P.2d 168 (1996).
n292. Id. at 544-45, 920 P.2d at 170 (footnote omitted).
n293. 142 Or. App. 261, 921 P.2d 409 (1996).
n294. Id. at 265, 921 P.2d at 411.
n295. 153 Or. App. 442, 958 P.2d 854 (1998).
n296. Id. at 444-48, 958 P.2d at 857-60.
n297. Id. at 454-55, 958 P.2d at 863.
n298. The lead opinion based its decision entirely on the physical characteristics of the store:
The shopping center at issue in this case is approximately 110,000 square feet. That is about the
same size as the Raleigh Hills Fred Meyer shopping center discussed in Dameron, and significantly
larger than the Hawthorne Fred Meyer shopping center discussed in Cargill. The shopping center at
issue here has parking lots on three sides, and all of the customer entrances open onto the parking
lots. The shopping center conducts approximately 18,000 transactions per week through the main
checkout stands, excluding sales that occur in the separate departments, such as jewelry and
nutrition, which have their own cash registers. It sells a wide range of consumer products, from food
and beverages to clothing, sporting goods, automotive goods, electronics, housewares, drugs, and
jewelry. It has tenant businesses that provide banking services, shoe repair, and dry cleaning. A
beauty salon and a Vista Optical store also are tenants. A separate home improvement center is
located in a building across a public street.
Like the shopping center at issue in Cargill, the shopping center at issue here is designed to meet
a wide range of consumer needs. The shopping center endeavors to provide a wide range of
products and services on the premises because it wants its customers to meet all of their consumer
needs, and spend all of their consumer dollars, at the shopping center. Fred Meyer has, for its own
advantage, extended a broad invitation to the public to come to its shopping center. None of the
entrances, including entrances to the tenant businesses, is accessible from a public sidewalk. A
public street separates the main shopping center from the home improvement center. A wide array
of commercial services is available at this shopping center and in the surrounding area. In sum, the
Fred Meyer shopping center at issue here is physically similar to those at issue in Dameron and
Cargill, it is used for similar purposes, and the scope of its invitation to the public is equally broad.
This evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the shopping center at issue here is a "large
shopping center," as that term has been used in cases such as Dameron.
 Id. (citation omitted).
n299. Id. at 471-80, 958 P.2d at 872-77 (Leeson, J., concurring).
n300. Id. at 481-97, 958 P.2d at 877-87 (Landau, J., dissenting).
n301. Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 11 P.3d 228 (2000).
n302. Id. at 54, 11 P.3d at 237 ("We note that, when construing provisions of the Oregon
Constitution, it long has been the practice of this court 'to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted it.'") (quoting Jones v. Hoss,
132 Or. 175, 178, 285 P. 205 (1930)).
n303. Id. at 54-55, 11 P.3d at 237-38.
n304. Id.
n305. See infra notes 357-96 and accompanying text.
n306. Stranahan 331 Or. at 65, 11 P.3d at 243.
n307. The court went so far as to invite suggestions that other decisions cannot be squared with
the Priest methodology:
We remain willing to reconsider a previous ruling under the Oregon Constitution whenever a party
presents to us a principled argument suggesting that, in an earlier decision, this court wrongly
considered or wrongly decided the issue in question. We will give particular attention to arguments
that either present new information as to the meaning of the constitutional provision at issue or that
demonstrate some failure on the part of this court at the time of the earlier decision to follow its
usual paradigm for considering and construing the meaning of the provision in question.
n308. Id. at 54, 11 P.3d at 237 (emphasis added). That would suggest that the court is willing to
reconsider cases such as Robertson and Clark, which certainly would represent a major shift in the
court's approach to constitutional interpretation. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
n309. 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983).
n310. Id. at 262, 666 P.2d at 1318.
n311. Id. at 265-66, 666 P.2d at 1320.
n312. Id. at 266-67, 666 P.2d at 1320-21.
n313. For an interesting quantitative analysis of the extent to which the Oregon Supreme Court
follows its own "first things first" doctrine, see generally John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled
Interpretations of State Constitutional Law: Why Don't the "Primacy" States Practice What They
Preach?, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1019 (1993). The author examined fifty-two opinions from the 1988
and 1991 terms in which both state and federal constitutional claims were implicated and found that
in only twenty-one of those cases did the court adhere to the primacy doctrine of state constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 1041-43.
n314. 323 Or. 167, 916 P.2d 291 (1996).
n315. Id. at 169-70, 916 P.2d at 294.
n316. Id. at 173-76, 916 P.2d at 296-97.
n317. Id. at 176-78, 916 P.2d at 297-98.
n318. Id. at 178, 916 P.2d at 298.
n319. Id. at 177, 916 P.2d at 298.
n320. Id. at 178, 916 P.2d at 298 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 267, 666 P.2d 1316,
1321 (1983)).
n321. Id. at 179, 916 P.2d at 299 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
n322. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
n323. "'Lest there be any doubt about it, when this court cites federal opinions in interpreting a
provision of Oregon law, it does so because it finds the views there expressed persuasive, not
because it considers itself bound to do so.'" Billings, 323 Or. at 178-79 n.13, 916 P.2d at 298 n.13
(quoting Kennedy, 295 Or. at 267, 666 P.2d at 1321).
n324. Id. at 180, 916 P.2d at 299.
n325. 301 Or. 268, 721 P.2d 1357 (1986).
n326. The constitution provides:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
 Or. Const. art. I, 9.
n327. Brown, 301 Or. at 274-75, 721 P.2d at 1360-61.
n328. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
n329. Brown, 301 Or. at 275-76, 721 P.2d at 1361-62.
n330. Id. at 274, 721 P.2d at 1361.
n331. Id. at 284, 721 P.2d at 1366-67 (Linde, J., dissenting).
n332. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
n333. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 315 Or. 500, 512-13, 849 P.2d 446, 433 (1993).
n334. Cereghino v. State, 230 Or. 439, 444-45, 370 P.2d 694, 697 (1962).
n335. 282 Or. 591, 581 P.2d 50 (1978).
n336. Id. at 614, 581 P.2d at 63.
n337. The court paid particular attention to Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York,
350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976). It also cited Jensen v. City of New York, 369 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y.
1977); N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Town of North Hempstead, 363 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1977); and Charles v.
Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977).
n338. 294 Or. 254, 656 P.2d 306 (1982).
n339. Id. at 259 n.5, 656 P.2d at 309 n.5 (emphasis added).
n340. 312 Or. 568, 825 P.2d 641 (1992).
n341. Id. at 573 n.4, 825 P.2d at 644 n.4.
n342. 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993).
n343. Id. at 135 n.5, 854 P.2d at 452 n.5.
n344. 321 Or. 458, 900 P.2d 495 (1995)
n345. Id. at 468 n.6, 900 P.2d at 501 n.6.
n346. Even when the parties rely solely on state constitutional law, the court has proven
disinclined to examine the text and history of article I, section 18, to determine its intended
meaning. Dodd v. Hood River County, 317 Or. 172, 855 P.2d 608 (1993), bears out the point. In
that case, the owners of property located in a forestry zone applied for a conditional-use permit to
build a single-family dwelling. When they first acquired the property, the applicable zoning allowed
such construction, but because the zoning since had changed, the application was denied. The
landowners challenged the constitutionality of the decision, arguing that it amounted to a taking of
property. The court held that there was evidence that the timber on the property was capable of
generating at least some profitable use and that, as a result, under Fifth Avenue, there was no taking.
The court declined to reconsider its decision in Fifth Avenue, which was based on federal
constitutional law. Id. at 185-86, 855 P.2d at 615-16.
n347. 294 Or. 269, 656 P.2d 315 (1982).
n348. Id. at 272, 656 P.2d at 317.
n349. See, e.g., State v. Lajoie, 316 Or. 63, 849 P.2d 479 (1993).
n350. 313 Or. 356, 836 P.2d 1308 (1992).
n351. Id. at 380, 836 P.2d at 1323.
n352. 101 Or. 657, 201 P. 445 (1921).
n353. 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
n354. 306 Or. 231, 759 P.2d 1054 (1988).
n355. Id. at 235, 759 P.2d at 1057.
n356. 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225 (1985).
n357. The court explained: "The emergency doctrine is a carefully and narrowly drawn
exception to the warrant requirement. When the premises is a dwelling, the state must make a strong
showing that exceptional emergency circumstances truly existed." Id. at 229, 709 P.2d at 244
(quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970)).
n358. Or. Const. art. IV, 1, allocates the legislative power of the state to the Legislative
Assembly, subject to the people's "reserved" powers of initiative and referendum. For general
descriptions of the initiative and referendum powers and the history of their exercise, see generally
Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (1989),
and David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States
(1984). See also David B. Magelby, Direct Legislation in the American States, in Referendums
Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy 218 (David B. Magelby & Austin
Ranney eds., 1994). On the origins of the rights of initiative and referendum in Oregon, see
generally David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon
U'Ren and "The Oregon System," 67 Temp. L. Rev. 947 (1994).
n359. See, e.g., Norman J. Singer, 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction 36.05 (4th ed. 1986)
(stating that statutes enacted by legislature and by initiative have equal force and effect); see also
Westerberg v. Andrus, 757 P.2d 664, 670 (Idaho 1988) ("In construing a law for both definitional
and constitutional purposes, courts see no essential difference between measures enacted by
initiative and referendum and those created through the usual legislative process. Neither is superior
to the other, and are treated as equal in regard to their force, effect, and limitations."). I am aware of
no Oregon case that actually addresses this issue. Nevertheless, the Oregon courts have never drawn
a distinction, in terms of legal effect, between statutes or constitutional provisions enacted by
initiative or by the ordinary legislative process. To the contrary, the courts always have given such
enactments equal effect.
n360. 318 Or. 551, 871 P.2d 106 (1994).
n361. See Or. Rev. Stat. 461.215(1) (1999) ("The Oregon State Lottery Commission may
initiate a game or games using video devices ....").
n362. Or. Const. art. XV, 4(7).
n363. Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or. at 559, 871 P.2d at 110.
n364. Id. at 560, 871 P.2d at 111 (citations omitted).
n365. 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993).
n366. For critical analyses of the methodology, see Steven J. Johansen, What Does Ambiguous
Mean?: Making Sense of Statutory Analysis in Oregon, 34 Willamette L. Rev. 219 (1998), and Jack
L. Landau, Some Observations About Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32 Willamette L. Rev. 1
(1996).
n367. PGE, 317 Or. at 610, 859 P.2d at 1145 ("In interpreting a statute, the court's task is to
discern the intent of the legislature.").
n368. Id.
n369. Id. at 611-12, 859 P.2d at 1146. The court stated:
If the legislature's intent is clear from the above-described inquiry into text and context, further
inquiry is unnecessary. If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and
context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative
history.
Id.
n370. Id. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1146.
n371. Out of 198 statutory construction cases published since PGE, the Oregon Supreme Court
has resorted to legislative history in 42 of them. That is to say, in 79% of the cases, the court
determined that the meaning of the statute at issue was clear from an examination of its text.
n372. Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon v. Oregon State Lottery Comm'n, 318 Or. 551, 560-61,
871 P.2d 106, 112 (1994) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 347 (1976)).
n373. Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or. at 560-61, 871 P.2d at 111.
n374. Id. at 562, 871 P.2d at 113.
n375. Id.
n376. Id. at 575, 871 P.2d at 119 (Fadeley, J., concurring).
n377. Id. at 577-78, 871 P.2d at 120 (footnote omitted) (Unis, J., concurring).
n378. 305 Or. 472, 753 P.2d 939 (1988).
n379. Or. Const. art. V, 15a.
n380. The court stated:
While plaintiffs rely on this history of article V, section 15a, defendants urge us to disregard the
historical evidence of its purpose and scope. They argue that resort to legislative history is improper
when the meaning of the text is "plain" or "unambiguous."
This and similar formulations are often recited, but in practice they do not and should not
confine the court to historically blind exegesis. A case dealing with the allocation of legislative and
executive power by the state's charter of government cannot be treated as if it involved the use of
parol evidence to vary the words of a private contract. When one side to a dispute over the meaning
of a public law urges a court not to look at or consider materials presented by the other side for its
reading of the law, this only invites doubt whether the materials might show that the "plain
meaning" is not so plain after all. That is the case here.
In practice, also, courts rarely see disputes over interpretation when the opposing party cannot
show a possible alternative reading of the words, which it claims to be correct in context. That, too,
is true in this case.
 Lipscomb, 305 Or. at 484, 753 P.2d at 946 (footnotes omitted).
n381. Id. at 480-84, 753 P.2d at 943-46.
n382. The court stated:
Contemporaneous materials widely available to the voters in 1921, particularly the explanation by a
committee of legislators in the official Voters' Pamphlet, leave no doubt that the amendment to
article V, section 15a, was intended to authorize the Governor to veto a declaration of emergency in
a bill so as to protect the opportunity of voters to petition for a referendum. Although the wording of
the amendment also could suggest a much broader power to veto individual provisions of
nonappropriation bills, it is not believable that such a broad power would have gone unmentioned
and undebated if anyone had understood the amendment as defendants now contend.
 Id. at 486, 753 P.2d at 947.
n383. See supra notes 252-305 and accompanying text.
n384. Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 54, 11 P.3d 228, 237 (2000).
n385. Id. at 55, 11 P.3d at 237.
n386. Id. at 57, 11 P.3d at 239.
n387. Id.
n388. Id. at 58 n.12, 11 P.3d at 239 n.12.
n389. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct
Democracy, 1996 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 477. Frickey's principal concern is that lawmaking by
initiative is in tension with the federal constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government.
Id. at 478-79. His premise is that Article IV, Section 4, of the Federal Constitution - generally
known as the "Guaranty Clause" - reflects the Framers' concerns that representative government is
an essential component of republican government. Id. at 482-85. Representative government,
Frickey suggests, provides the opportunity for deliberation by elected officials insulated from
momentary public passions. Id. Direct democracy does not. Therefore, he argues, direct democracy
is at odds with republican values and, if the process is not unconstitutional, at least its products
should be subject to more searching review; in particular, he argues that the application of certain
"limiting canons" of construction properly may inject republican values into the interpretive
process. Id. at 510-26. For a critique of Frickey's proposal, see Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes
Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34
Willamette L. Rev. 487 (1998).
n390. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 Yale L.J. 107 (1995). Schacter focuses on the existence of, and impossibility of
ascertaining, "voter intent." She argues that the interpretive questions that arise from the enactment
of initiative measures generally are too complicated and technical to justify any assumption that the
voters possessed any articulable intentions. Id. at 126-28. According to Schacter, voters generally
have little knowledge about the substance of the measures that they enact and are especially
vulnerable to manipulation by the drafters during the enactment process. Id. at 127-30. She proposes
that courts should forthrightly acknowledge these "pathologies" inherent in the direct democracy
process and address them by permitting interested parties, in effect, to create post-enactment
legislative history about the purpose of the enactment and the legal context in which it was enacted.
Id. at 155-57. She also proposes that courts apply stricter interpretive rules that would limit the
effect of initiative measures because of the inherently suspect enactment processes that produced
them. Id. at 156-59. For a critique of her proposal, see Landau, supra note 389.
n391. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
n392. Or. Const. art. IV, 1 (amended 1998).
n393. Or. Const. art. I, 42 ("to preserve and protect the rights of crime victims to justice"). The
provision was declared unconstitutional in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998),
on the ground that it contained too many constitutional amendments to be submitted to the voters in
a single enactment.
n394. Article IV, section 6(1), states:
A senatorial district shall consist of two representative districts. Any Senator whose term continues
through the next regular legislative session after the effective date of the reapportionment shall be
specifically assigned to a senatorial district. The ratio of Senators and Representatives, respectively,
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